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PRISON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE
MEASURES
Alexander Volokh*
ABSTRACT
A few decades of comparative studies of public vs. private prison
performance have failed to give a strong edge to either sector in terms of
quality. That supposed market incentives haven’t delivered spectacular results
is unsurprising, since, by and large, market incentives haven’t been allowed to
work: outcomes are rarely measured and are even more rarely made the basis
of compensation, and prison providers are rarely given substantial flexibility
to experiment with alternative models.
This Article argues that performance measures should be implemented
more widely in evaluating prisons. Implementing performance measures would
advance our knowledge of which sector does a better job, facilitate a regime of
competitive neutrality between the public and private sectors, promote greater
clarity about the goals of prisons, and, perhaps most importantly, allow the use
of performance-based contracts.
Performance measures and performance-based contracts have their
critiques, for example: (1) the theoretical impossibility of knowing the proper
prices, (2) the ways they would change the composition of the industry, for
instance, by reducing public-interestedness or discouraging risk-averse
providers, and (3) the potentially undesirable strategic behavior that would
result, such as manipulation in the choice of goals, distortion of effort away
from hard-to-measure dimensions or away from hard-to-serve inmates, or
outright falsification of the numbers. I argue that these concerns are serious
but aren’t so serious as to preclude substantial further experimentation.
* Associate Professor, Emory Law School, avolokh@emory.edu. I am grateful to Michael J. Broyde,
Russell C. Gabriel, Leonard Gilroy, Linda Hardyman, Erica J. Hashimoto, Peter H. Kyle, Christina Mulligan,
Carl Nink, Usha Rodrigues, Joanna E. Saul, Sarah M. Shalf, Vladimir Volokh, and the participants at the
Emory/UGA joint faculty colloquium for their input and assistance. I am also grateful to Kedar Bhatia and
Julia Hueckel for their able research assistance, and to the law librarians at Emory Law School. Thanks also to
the organizers and panelists of the Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, Privatization: Managing Liability and
Reassessing Practices in Local and International Contexts, on February 7, 2013. A previous version of this
Article was presented as the keynote address at the Vermont Law Review's symposium, Prison Privatization:
Optimizing Our Use of a Privatized Resource, on March 23, 2013.
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“Here arises a feature of the Circumlocution Office, not previously mentioned
in the present record. When that admirable Department got into trouble, and was,
by some infuriated member of Parliament . . . attacked on the merits . . . as an
Institution wholly abominable and Bedlamite; then the noble or right honourable
[member] who represented it in the House, would smite that member and cleave
him asunder, with a statement of the quantity of business (for the prevention of
business) done by the Circumlocution Office. Then would that noble or right
honourable [member] hold in his hand a paper containing a few figures, to which,
with the permission of the House, he would entreat its attention. . . . Then would
the noble or right honourable [member] perceive, sir, from this little document,
which he thought might carry conviction even to the perversest mind . . . , that
within the short compass of the last financial half-year, this much-maligned
Department . . . had written and received fifteen thousand letters . . . , had made
twenty-four thousand minutes . . . , and thirty-two thousand five hundred and
seventeen memoranda . . . . [T]he sheets of foolscap paper it had devoted to the
public service would pave the footways on both sides of Oxford Street from end to
end, and leave nearly a quarter of a mile to spare for the park . . . ; while of tape—
red tape—it had used enough to stretch, in graceful festoons, from Hyde Park
Corner to the General Post Office. . . . No one . . . would [then] have the
hardihood to hint that the more the Circumlocution Office did, the less was done,
and that the greatest blessing it could confer on an unhappy public would be to do
nothing.”
1
—Charles Dickens, Little Dorrit
“The results obtained from ENRD’s civil and criminal cases in fiscal year
2012 alone were outstanding. We secured over $397 million in civil and stipulated
penalties, cost recoveries, natural resource damages, and other civil monetary
relief, including almost $133 million recovered for the Superfund. We obtained
over $6.9 billion in corrective measures through court orders and settlements,
which will go a long way toward protecting our air, water and other natural
resources. We concluded 47 criminal cases against 83 defendants, obtaining
nearly 21 years in confinement and over $38 million in criminal fines, restitution,
community service funds and special assessments.”
2

—DOJ’s Environment & Natural Resources Division Annual Report, 2012
1

CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE DORRIT 517–18 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (1857).
ENV’T & NATURAL RES. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENRD ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2012, at 8 (2013).
2
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INTRODUCTION
“Isn’t everything to be said on [private prisons] already in print?” asks
Sharon Dolovich.3 She means the question to be merely rhetorical; and so do
I.4 The comparative effectiveness debate, to the extent it’s relevant5—and I
think it is6—has stalled, simply because the empirical literature, exhaustive as
it is, is so bad. “The current weight of the evidence on prison privatization in
the United States is so light that it defies interpretation,” write prison
researcher Gerald Gaes and his coauthors.7 (The theory isn’t much better: the
same authors characterize prison performance as a “theoretically bereft
domain.”)8 To intelligently choose between public and private provision, we
should at least know which sector costs less, but we don’t; and we should at
least know which sector provides higher quality, but we don’t have a great
sense of that either.9
This seems puzzling: readers of the voluminous debate on private prisons
can be forgiven for thinking that market incentives should make private prison
firms either (1) cut wasteful expenditures and produce innovative services10 or
(2) cut corners on essential inmate care and security and lead to a humanitarian

3

Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 128, 129 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
4 Not that her perspective is the same as mine, but we both agree that there’s still something left to say
on the subject.
5 Dolovich herself is wary of premature engagement with the comparative effectiveness debate without
having sorted through the necessary normative issues beforehand. See Dolovich, supra note 3, at 128–29;
Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 447 n.20 (2005).
6 See generally Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee–Contractor Distinction, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2012).
7 GERALD G. GAES ET AL., MEASURING PRISON PERFORMANCE: GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 184 (2004).
8 Id. at 123.
9 These aren’t the only things we should know. For instance, we can also care about where
accountability is greater, which sector might be more likely to push the substantive criminal law in a more proincarceration direction, and the like. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of
Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1199–1205 (2008); Developments in the Law—The Law of
Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1868–91 (2002).
10 See, e.g., GEOFFREY F. SEGAL & ADRIAN T. MOORE, WEIGHING THE WATCHMEN: EVALUATING THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OUTSOURCING CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, PART II: REVIEWING THE LITERATURE ON
COST AND QUALITY COMPARISONS 15 (Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Policy Study No. 290, 2002); Samuel Jan
Brakel & Kimberly Ingersoll Gaylord, Prison Privatization and Public Policy, in CHANGING THE GUARD:
PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE CONTROL OF CRIME 125, 134–43 (Alexander Tabarrok ed., 2003).
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disaster.11 Let’s focus on the positive claims for private prisons: if the private
sector is so clearly superior, shouldn’t the difference hit us between the eyes?12
On second thought, this isn’t so puzzling after all. The advantages of
market provision are often said to be that, what with the rigidities and lowincentive structure of government agencies, private firms have greater
incentive and greater flexibility to figure out how to achieve any desired level
of quality. But this assumes that (1) particular levels of quality are desired or
encouraged, and (2) private firms are given the flexibility to achieve these
levels. It turns out that both of these assumptions are wrong.
Let’s take the quality problem first. Why not tally up the quality at a public
prison, do the same at a comparable private prison, and compare the two
quality measures? The trouble here is that—despite the scores of studies that
have been produced purporting to measure quality differences—good
performance measures are rarely used. As I document in Part I, this means that
comparative quality studies are hard to interpret if one wants to know which
sector is better. (This hasn’t prevented both partisans and detractors of private
prisons from producing loosely reasoned pieces that oversell the findings of
their favorite studies.)
It doesn’t have to be that way. Criminologists have produced no shortage of
performance measures that are appropriate for evaluating prisons, using
variables like in-prison violence, the quality of prison health care, the degree of
crowding, and—which I think is immensely important—recidivism.13 The
most important thing about a performance measure is that it measure
performance, that is, outcomes. Inputs like money spent, guards hired, or
programs offered are of quite limited value, since the whole point is to see
whether the money spent is worthwhile, whether the guards hired are
necessary, and whether the programs are effective. Outputs like the number of
doctor visits or the number of graduates of rehabilitative programs—like the
number of memos written by Dickens’s Circumlocution Office14 or the number

11

See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 5, at 474–80.
See, e.g., Philippe C. Schmitter, The “Organizational Development” of International Organizations,
25 INT’L ORG. 917, 932 (1971) (calling this the “interocular impact test”).
13 I first (briefly) advocated performance measures for prison accountability in my student note. See
Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 9, at 1887–88; see also Francis T. Cullen et al., The
Accountable Prison, 28 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 77, 83 (2012) (“The core goal of the accountable prison is to
reduce inmates’ recidivism.” (italics omitted)).
14 See supra text accompanying note 1.
12
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of years of prison resulting from DOJ prosecutions15—are also of limited
value. Doctor visits might just be make-work; the rehabilitative programs may
not actually be rehabilitative. (The Circumlocution Office, whose function is to
prevent things from being done,16 has a zero or negative contribution to
performance; and the prosecutions that maximize prison time aren’t necessarily
the same as those that most improve the environment.) What we care about—
prisoner health, decent conditions, actual rehabilitation—are the outcomes that
we should actually measure, to the extent possible.17
Why should we use performance measures? There are several reasons,
which I canvass in Part II.
First, it’s good just to know whether the public or private sector has higher
quality, for instance in evaluating whether one’s state should outsource or
insource a particular project, or whether it should be one of the nineteen states
that don’t use private prisons at all.18 Naturally, many factors determine
performance other than the quality of the management and the facilities: for
instance, a prison can have better performance numbers because it was sent a
better crop of people. But certainly having performance measures is better than
useless.
Second, using performance measures would help to implement a regime of
competitive neutrality, where the public and private sectors could bid against
each other and individual projects could shuffle from one sector to another.
Competitive neutrality might be better than an all-public or all-private regime,
but to implement it properly, the auctions should be evenhanded, which means
that proposed costs and proposed quality targets should be fairly comparable.
Performance measures would allow a winning contractor to commit to deliver
a particular level of performance, and would allow governments to levy the
appropriate contractual fine if this level isn’t achieved (or grant the appropriate
reward if the level is exceeded).

15

See supra text accompanying note 2.
DICKENS, supra note 1, at 104–23.
17 See BERYL A. RADIN, CHALLENGING THE PERFORMANCE MOVEMENT: ACCOUNTABILITY,
COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 15–16 (2006) (defining “input,” “output,” “outcome,” and other
terms).
18 See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
BULL. No. NCJ 239808, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 32 tbl.15 (2012) (listing Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia as states with no inmates in private
prisons in 2011).
16
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Third, it would help policymakers express what’s desirable in prisons. One
would think that this had been done already; but prison contracts are written in
input and output terms because this is largely how the industry works and
thinks. Performance measures have been a byproduct of the debate over prison
privatization: the different sides in the debate needed them to argue in favor of
or against privatization; and the development of these measures has in turn
spurred serious thinking about what prisons should accomplish, which has had
accountability benefits for the public sector as well.
Perhaps most importantly, the use of performance measures would allow
the spread of performance-based contracting, where—instead of levying a fine
for not delivering a particular level of performance—one varies the contract
fee continuously with the level of performance delivered. Once accountability
is tied to actual performance—as is actually being done in the U.K.—giving
prison providers the flexibility to choose how to do their job becomes more
attractive.
Part III discusses critiques of using performance measures as part of a
compensation scheme.
One concern is that the true social benefits of various aspects of
performance are unknowable, either in principle or in practice, so that
determining the proper prices will inevitably fail. Where a service is closely
bound up with justice concerns, a focus on efficiency pricing may be
inappropriate: it might demean the service or give insufficient weight to nonefficiency goals.
A second problem is that the use of performance measures will alter the
composition of providers in the industry, in ways that are perhaps undesirable.
One way this might happen is that, in the presence of monetary incentives,
public-interested people may be less attracted to corrections. A different way
performance measures can alter the composition of the industry is by
increasing risk for providers. Providers can only control inputs, and the
connection between inputs and outcomes is highly variable, because it depends
on a great many variables, many of which are beyond the prison’s control—
such as general social conditions or the underlying quality of the inmates. The
relationship between any of these variables and outcomes is not very well
known. One might care about the fairness of rewarding or penalizing providers
based on factors beyond their control, though in an auction system, such
windfalls will be canceled out by competitive bidding. More seriously, the
riskiness might bias the set of available providers in favor of the largest and
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best-capitalized firms, and perhaps discourage experimentation with risky but
promising techniques. This means that the sensitivity of price to outcomes
might have to be limited, which might also limit the incentive effects.
A third problem is that providers may engage in undesirable strategic
behavior. They might manipulate the performance goals so they are easy to
meet. They might focus their effort on the measurable dimensions of
performance and slight the unmeasurable ones. (For example, what are the true
outcomes of the justice system? Some outcomes, like case backlogs, are
measurable, but other important outcomes, like accuracy of adjudication,
aren’t—and measuring one runs the risk of distorting the agency’s effort away
from the unmeasured outcomes.)19 Similarly, providers will want to choose the
easiest-to-treat populations (“creaming” or “cherry-picking”), and (given a
population) fail to treat the hardest-to-treat members (“parking”). And, of
course, any system based on particular numbers comes with the risk that
someone might try to falsify the numbers.
The good news is that, for prisons, there’s hope that these concerns can be
fairly addressed. At the very least, these concerns don’t seem so serious as to
preclude far more experimentation than has been happening so far. We actually
have access to reasonably good performance measures that reasonably cover
the important dimensions of prison quality, none of which have to be limited to
efficiency-based measures. These measures should be set by corrections
departments, not by contractors. Riskiness can be addressed, at least in part, by
only making part of the payment depend on performance. Social impact bonds
have some promise in encouraging nonprofit-sector financing; in any event, the
prison market is already highly concentrated, so there is currently no vast
population of nonprofits and small companies to lose. Cherry-picking can be
addressed by giving contractors no say in what inmates they’re given, and
parking can be addressed, at least in part, by making monetary rewards depend
on observable characteristics of the inmate (if, indeed, it’s a problem at all).
Outright falsification of performance measures is a serious problem, which
requires seriously investing in monitoring and ensuring robust disclosure
regimes.

19 One might think that the reversal rate is a measure of accuracy of adjudication. But this isn’t true
because (1) the cases selected for appeal aren’t random (in the absence of some special process to verify
accuracy), and (2) given deferential standards of review, judges can work to insulate their decisions from
appellate review if they’re so inclined—for instance, by making them more intensely fact-based.
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None of these are perfect fixes, but we don’t need perfection; we just need
an improvement over the status quo.
I. THE FAILURE OF COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES
Somewhat surprisingly, for all the ink spilled on private prisons over the
last thirty years, we have precious little good information on what are surely
some of the most important questions: when it comes to cost or quality, are
private prisons better or worse than public prisons?
It’s safe to say that, so far at least, the political process hasn’t encouraged
rigorous comparative evaluations of public and private prisons. Some states
allow privatization without requiring cost and quality evaluations at all.20 The
nineteen states that don’t privatize21 might, for all I know, be right to do so, but
of course their stance doesn’t promote comparative evaluation.
When studies are done, they’re usually so inadequate from a
methodological perspective that we can’t reach any firm comparative
conclusions. Section A below discusses the problems with cost comparison
studies, and section B discusses the problems with quality comparison studies.
Section C takes a broader view and notes that even well-done comparative
effectiveness studies don’t answer all our questions.
A. Which Sector Costs Less?
1. Difficulties in Calculating Costs
How do we determine whether the private sector costs more or less than the
public sector? Ideally, we could work off of a large database of public and
private prisons and run a regression in which we controlled for jurisdiction,
demographic factors, size, and the like. In practice, this large database doesn’t
exist, and so the typical study chooses a small set of public and private prisons
that are supposedly comparable.

20 See Alexis M. Durham III, Evaluating Privatized Correctional Institutions: Obstacles to Effective
Assessment, FED. PROBATION, June 1988, at 65, 67; Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note
9, at 1873–74.
21 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Unfortunately, this comparability tends to be elusive; the public and private
facilities compared often “differ in ways that confound comparison of costs.”22
Sometimes no comparable facilities exist.23 Even where there are two prisons
in the jurisdiction housing inmates of the same sex and security classification,
they generally differ in size, age, level of crowding, inmate age mix, inmate
health mix, and facility design.24 In particular, adjusting facilities to take into
account different numbers of inmates is problematic, since facilities with more
inmates, other things equal, benefit from economies of scale.25
The GAO explained recently that “[i]t is not currently feasible to conduct a
methodologically sound cost comparison of BOP [Bureau of Prisons] and
private low and minimum security facilities because these facilities differ in
several characteristics and BOP does not collect comparable data to determine
the impact of these differences on cost.”26 The data problem mostly comes
from the private side: information collected by the BOP from private facilities
isn’t necessarily reported the same way that public data are reported, and the
reliability of the data is uncertain.27 Moreover, “[w]hile private
contractors . . . maintain some data for their records, these officials said that
the data are not readily available or in a format that would enable a
methodologically sound cost comparison at this time.”28
Not only do federal regulations not require that these data be collected,29
but also, and more troublingly, at the time of the GAO study in 2007, the BOP

22 DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT
PRACTICE 33 (1998).
23 See id. at 45 (making this claim about the Arizona facilities compared in CHARLES W. THOMAS, ARIZ.
DEP’T. OF CORR., COMPARING THE COST AND PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRISONS IN ARIZONA
(1997)); see also SCOTT D. CAMP & GERALD G. GAES, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1999: AN ASSESSMENT OF GROWTH, PERFORMANCE, CUSTODY STANDARDS, AND TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS 15 (2000).
24 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 34–35; see also Robert B. Levinson, Okeechobee: An
Evaluation of Privatization in Corrections, PRISON J., Oct. 1985, at 75, 77.
25 Gerry Gaes, Cost, Performance Studies Look at Prison Privatization, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Mar. 2008,
at 32, 34; Douglas C. McDonald, The Costs of Operating Public and Private Correctional Facilities, in
PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 86, 101 (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990).
26 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-6, COST OF PRISONS: BUREAU OF PRISONS NEEDS
BETTER DATA TO ASSESS ALTERNATIVES FOR ACQUIRING LOW AND MINIMUM SECURITY FACILITIES 4 (2007).
27 Id. at 12–13.
28 Id. at 5.
29 Id. at 13.
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didn’t believe there was value in developing the data collection methods that
would make valid public-private cost comparison methods possible.30
Probably more seriously, public and private prisons have accounting
procedures that “make the very identification of comparable costs difficult.”31
First, public systems, unlike private ones, don’t spread the costs of capital
assets over the life of the assets, which overstates public costs when the assets
are acquired and understates them in all other years.32
Second, various public expenditures, including employee benefits and
medical care, utilities, legal work, insurance, supplies and equipment, and
various contracted services, are often borne by various other agencies in
government, which might understate public costs by 30%–40%.33 One of the
often-ignored costs in the public sector is the cost of borrowing capital.34
Conversely, governments bear some of the costs of private firms, for instance,
in various cases, contract monitoring, inspection and licensing, personnel
training, inmate transportation, case management, and maintaining emergency
response teams.35
And third, when public or private prisons incur overhead expenditures,
there’s no obvious way of allocating overhead to particular facilities—Gerald
Gaes gives a specific numerical example involving Oklahoma, a highprivatization state, where a difference in overhead accounting can alter the
estimate of the cost of privatization by 7.4%.36

30 Id. at 7, 19, 30. The BOP’s view seems to have been chiefly based on the fact that it used private
contractors to run facilities for criminal aliens and wasn’t expecting to receive funding to run its own. Id. The
BOP also believed that the Taft cost study, see infra text accompanying notes 56–59, was already a sufficient
cost study. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 26, at 7, 19, 21, 30.
31 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 33; accord McDonald, supra note 25, at 88–89, 97–100.
32 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 35.
33 Id. at 36.
34 See McDonald, supra note 25, at 106.
35 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 36–37.
36 See Gerald G. Gaes, The Current Status of Prison Privatization Research on American Prisons 17–18
(Feb. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://works.bepress.com/gerald_gaes/1 (“Other complications arise
from the appropriate treatment of property, sales, or income taxes paid by private contractors, as well as profits
from inmate phone calls and commissary accounts.”); see also MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 37.
Private companies are also loath to divulge their own financial details. See McDonald, supra note 25, at 89;
see also OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, FLA. LEGISLATURE, REPORT NO.
95-48, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE GADSDEN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 2 (1996); PUB. ACCOUNTS
COMM., LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, N.S.W. PARLIAMENT, REPORT NO. 13/53 (NO. 156),VALUE FOR MONEY
FROM NSW CORRECTIONAL CENTRES 23 (2005).
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As a bottom-line matter, McDonald says “the uncounted costs of public
operation are probably larger than of private operation”;37 I tend to agree, but
it’s hard to say for sure.
2. Competing Cost Estimates
The best way to see the importance of various assumptions is to look at a
handful of cases where different people tried to estimate the same cost.
Without committing myself to which way is correct, I’ll provide three
examples: from Texas in 1987, from Florida in the late 1990s, and from the
federal Taft facility in 1999–2002.
a. Texas
In Texas, private prisons were authorized in 1987 with the passage of
Senate Bill 251,38 which required that private prisons show a 10% savings to
the state compared to public prisons.39 Calculating the per-diem cost of public
incarceration in Texas thus became important, since the maximum contract
price for private providers would be 90% of that cost.
The Texas Department of Corrections40 came up with an estimate of $27.62
per prisoner per day.41 The Legislative Budget Board, however, proposed a
number of additions to this cost, to better take into account the costs of
complying with Ruiz v. Estelle,42 building costs, the state’s cost to provide
additional programs that private firms would be required to provide, and the
like.43 All these adjustments raised the estimated per-diem cost by about
50%—to $41.67.44 In the end, contracts were awarded within a range of $28.72
to $33.80—between the two estimates, though closer to the first one.45
37

McDonald, supra note 25, at 100.
C. Elaine Cummins, Private Prisons in Texas, 1987–2000, at 15 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, American University) (on file with author).
39 Id. at 42; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 495.003(c)(4) (West 2012).
40 Now absorbed into the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
AGENCY STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2013–17, at 2 (2012).
41 Cummins, supra note 38, at 155.
42 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (requiring the Texas Department of Corrections to alleviate
overcrowding, increase the number of guards and support staff, and provide adequate health services), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), amended in part, vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.
1982).
43 See Cummins, supra note 38, at 156–57.
44 Id. at 156 tbl.9.
45 Id. at 158; see also GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 87–88. One facility received an extra $7.41 for an
“intensive substance abuse treatment program.” Cummins, supra note 38, at 158.
38
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b. Florida
In Florida, the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability (OPPAGA) compared two private facilities, Bay Correctional
Facility and Moore Haven Correctional Facility, with a public facility, Lawtey
Correctional Institution.46 After various adjustments, OPPAGA calculated that
the per-diem operating cost was $46.08 at Bay and $44.18 at Moore Haven,
versus $45.98 at Lawtey; that is, Bay was 0.2% more expensive and Moore
Haven 3.9% cheaper than the public facility.47
The Florida Department of Corrections had come up with its own numbers:
$45.04 at Bay and $46.32 at Moore Haven, versus $45.37 at Lawtey48: Bay
was 0.7% cheaper and Moore Haven 2.1% more expensive.
The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which operated Bay,
submitted comments to the OPPAGA report, disputing its analysis.49 It
disagreed that Lawtey was comparable,50 and suggested its own adjustments to
OPPAGA’s numbers for all three facilities. Under CCA’s analysis, Bay cost
$45.16 and Moore Haven cost $46.32, versus $49.30 for Lawtey, which comes
out to cost savings of 8.4% for Bay and 6.0% for Moore Haven.51 (OPPAGA,
understandably, disputed CCA’s modifications.)52
c. Taft
Perhaps the best example of competing, side-by-side cost studies comes
from the evaluation of the federal facility in Taft, California, operated by The
GEO Group.
A Bureau of Prisons cost study by Julianne Nelson compared the costs of
Taft in fiscal years 1999 through 2002 to those of three federal public facilities:

46 OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, FLA. LEGISLATURE, REPORT NO.
97-68, REVIEW OF BAY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND MOORE HAVEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 9 (1998)
[hereinafter OPPAGA].
47 Id.
48 FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., 1996–97 ANNUAL REPORT (1997), available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/
annual/9697/budget.html. These estimates were analyzed in FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., PRIVATIZATION IN THE
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (1998). See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 191 n.4.
49 OPPAGA, supra note 46, at 55–61 (providing CCA’s comments with OPPAGA’s comments
interspersed throughout).
50 Id. at 57.
51 Id. at 61.
52 See id. at 59.
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Elkton, Forrest City, and Yazoo City.53 The Taft costs ranged from $33.21 to
$38.62; the costs of the three public facilities ranged from $34.84 to $40.71.54
Taft was cheaper than all comparison facilities and in all years, by up to $2.42
(about 6.6%)—except in fiscal year 2001, when the Taft facility was more
expensive than the public Elkton facility by $0.25 (about 0.7%).55 Sloppily
averaging over all years and all comparison institutions, the savings was about
2.8%.
A National Institute of Justice study by Douglas McDonald and Kenneth
Carlson56 found much higher cost savings. They calculated Taft costs ranging
from $33.25 to $38.37, and public facility costs ranging from $39.46 to
$46.38.57 Private-sector savings ranged from 9.0% to 18.4%. Again averaging
over all years and all comparison institutions, the savings was about 15.0%: the
two cost studies differ in their estimates of private-sector savings by a factor of
about five.
Why such a difference? First, the Nelson study (but not the McDonald and
Carlson study) adjusted expenditures to iron out Taft’s economies of scale
from handling about 300 more inmates each year than the public facilities.58
Second, the studies differed in what they included in overhead costs, with the
Nelson study allocating a far higher overhead rate.59
These examples should be enough to give a sense of the complications in
cost comparisons; given these difficulties, it’s not surprising that most studies
have fallen short.

53 JULIANNE NELSON, THE CNA CORP., COMPETITION IN CORRECTIONS: COMPARING PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTOR OPERATIONS 10, 39 fig.4, 42 fig.5 (2005).
54 Id. at 42 fig.5.
55 See id. The study also compared actual GEO costs to hypothetical costs if Taft had been kept in-house.
This comparison gave the edge to the public sector, id. at 25–26, but I don’t stress this result because it’s based
on a comparison with a hypothetical public institution, not on actual public-sector costs.
56 Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth Carlson, Contracting for Imprisonment in the Federal Prison
System: Cost and Performance of the Privately Operated Taft Correctional Institution (Oct. 1, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211990.pdf.
57 Id. at 48 tbl.2.18.
58 Gaes, supra note 25, at 34.
59 Id. at 34–35; Gaes, supra note 36, at 20.
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B. Which Sector Provides Higher Quality?
1. Difficulties in Figuring Out Quality
Moving on to quality comparisons, the picture is similarly grim. As with
cost comparisons, sometimes no comparable facility exists in the same
jurisdiction.60 Some studies solve that problem by looking at prisons in
different jurisdictions, an approach that has its own problems.61 (If one had a
large database with several prisons in each jurisdiction, one could control for
the jurisdiction, but this approach is of course unavailable when comparing
two prisons, each in its own jurisdiction.) Many studies just don’t control for
clearly relevant variables in determining whether a facility is truly
comparable.62
Often, the comparability problem boils down to differences in inmate
populations; one prison may have a more difficult population than the other,
even if they have the same security level. Usually prisons have different
populations because of the luck of the draw,63 but sometimes it’s by design, as
60 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 54–55 (discussing Arizona facilities compared in THOMAS,
supra note 23); see also Gerald G. Gaes et al., The Performance of Privately Operated Prisons: A Review of
Research, in MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, app. 2, at 12 (discussing Arizona facilities compared in
THOMAS, supra note 23).
61 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 55 (discussing Charles H. Logan, Well Kept: Comparing
Quality of Confinement in Private and Public Prisons, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 577 (1992)); see also
CHARLES H. LOGAN, WELL KEPT: COMPARING QUALITY OF CONFINEMENT IN A PUBLIC AND A PRIVATE PRISON
(1991).
62 See, e.g., Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 5 (criticizing the use of univariate methods in the comparison of
Kentucky facilities in URBAN INST., COMPARISON OF PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY OPERATED CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES IN KENTUCKY AND MASSACHUSETTS (1989)); id. at 18 (discussing the lack of information on
characteristics of inmate populations in WILLIAM G. ARCHAMBEAULT & DONALD R. DEIS, JR., COST
EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISONS OF PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC PRISONS IN LOUISIANA: A COMPREHENSIVE
ANALYSIS OF ALLEN, AVOYELLES, AND WINN CORRECTIONAL CENTERS (1996)); id. at 19 (discussing the lack
of controls for differences in number of inmates at some comparison prisons in ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS,
supra); see also, e.g., GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 51–53 (discussing ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra); Scott
D. Camp & Gerald G. Gaes, Private Adult Prisons: What Do We Really Know and Why Don’t We Know
More?, in PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 283, 287 (David Shichor &
Michael J. Gilbert eds., 2001) (critiquing ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra, and THOMAS, supra note 23).
63 See Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 4 (discussing the comparison of Kentucky facilities in URBAN INST.,
supra note 62, where the public sector had a more difficult adult population while the private sector had a
more difficult juvenile population); id. at 9 (discussing TENN. SELECT OVERSIGHT COMM. ON CORR.,
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF PRIVATELY-MANAGED CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA PRISON
(SOUTH CENTRAL CORRECTIONAL CENTER) AND STATE-MANAGED PROTOTYPICAL PRISONS (NORTHEAST
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, NORTHWEST CORRECTIONAL CENTER) (1995)); id. at 11 (discussing ROBERT C.
THOMAS ET AL., LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMM., STATE OF WASH., DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
PRIVATIZATION FEASIBILITY STUDY (1996)); id. at 20 (criticizing the use of the Angola facility as a
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happened in Arizona, when the Department of Corrections chose “to refrain
from assigning prisoners to [a particular private prison] if they [had] serious or
chronic medical problems, serious psychiatric problems, or [were] deemed to
be unlikely to benefit from the substance abuse program that is provided at the
facility.”64 It’s actually quite common to not send certain inmates to private
prisons; the most common restriction in contracts is on inmates with special
medical needs.65 Not that all prisons must have totally random assignment; it
can be rational to tailor prisoner assignment to, say, the programming available
at a prison. But such practices do have “the unintended effect of undermining
cost comparisons.”66 Another practice that undermines cost comparisons is
contractual terms limiting the private contractor’s medical costs,67 though
nowadays it’s increasingly common for contracts to transfer all medical costs
to the contractor.68
Some performance studies rely on surveys administered to a nonrandom
sample of inmates69 or potentially biased staff surveys,70 or generally to
populations of inmates or staff that aren’t randomly assigned to public and
private prisons.71 Survey data aren’t useless, but they’re rarely used with the
comparison facility in ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra note 62); id. at 20–21 (discussing that low urinalysis hit
rates in ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra note 62, could indicate a population less inclined to use drugs, and low
medical risk scores could indicate a population less in need of serious medical care).
64 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 73.
65 CAMP & GAES, supra note 23, at 21–22 (noting some restrictions in effect in 62.5% of the contracts
surveyed; special medical needs restrictions in 50% of contracts; and other restrictions, including those for
high-publicity inmates and gang members).
66 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 73.
67 See, e.g., Contract between the State of Tennessee and Corrections Corporation of America, RFS
No.329.44-00408 § A.4.g.13)(a) (July 1, 2007), http://www.capitol.tn.gov/joint/committees/fiscal-review/
archives/106ga/contracts/RFS%20329.44-00408%20Correction%20%28CCA%20-%20amendment%201%29.
pdf [hereinafter Tennessee CCA 2007 contract] (“If the inmate is hospitalized, the Contractor shall not be
responsible for Inpatient-Hospital Costs which exceed $4,000.00 per Inmate per admission.”); id.
§ A.4.g.13)(b) (“The Contractor shall not be responsible for the cost of providing anti-retroviral medications
therapeutically indicated for the treatment of Inmates with AIDS or HIV infection.”). By its terms, this
contract covers services at the South Central Correctional Center, id. § A.1.j, and runs from 2007 to 2010, id.
§ B.1.
68 See, e.g., Notice of Request for Proposal, Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 5000 Minimum/Medium Security
Prison Beds, Solicitation No. 110054DC § 2.14.1 (Jan. 24, 2011) (on file with author) (“There is no medical
cap per inmate, per year. The Contractor shall assume all health care related costs.”).
69 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 6 (discussing DALE K. SECHREST & DAVID SHICHOR, PAROLE & CMTY.
SERVS. DIV., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR., FINAL REPORT: EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CALIFORNIA’S COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1994)).
70 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 24 (discussing staff surveys in LOGAN, supra note 61; Logan, supra note
61).
71 See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 74–76 (critiquing Judith Greene, Comparing Private and Public
Prison Services and Programs in Minnesota: Findings from Prisoner Interviews, 11 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM.

VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

1/21/2014 4:05 PM

PRISON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

355

appropriate sensitivity to its limitations.72 The higher-quality survey-based
studies don’t give the edge to either sector.73
Most damningly, many studies don’t rely on actual performance
measures,74 relying instead on facility audits that are largely process-based.75
Some supposed performance measures don’t necessarily indicate good
performance,76 especially when the prisons are compared based on a “laundry
list” of available data items (for instance, staff satisfaction) whose relevance to
good performance hasn’t been theoretically established.77
Gerald Gaes and his coauthors conclude that most studies are
“fundamentally flawed,” and agree with the GAO’s conclusion that there is
“little information that is widely applicable to various correctional settings.”78
I would add that accountability mechanisms vary widely—the standard
U.S. model, the Florida model, and the U.K. model are different,79 and these in
turn differ from the French model80 or the model proposed for prison
privatization in Israel before the Israeli Supreme Court invalidated the
JUST. 202 (1999); Judith Greene, Lack of Correctional Services, in CAPITALIST PUNISHMENT: PRISON
PRIVATIZATION & HUMAN RIGHTS (Andrew Coyle et al. eds., 2003); LOGAN, supra note 61; Logan, supra note
61); see also Scott D. Camp et al., Quality of Prison Operations in the US Federal Sector: A Comparison with
a Private Prison, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 27, 32–34 (2002) [hereinafter Camp et al., Quality of Prison
Operations]. For a general discussion of methods, see Scott D. Camp et al., Creating Performance Measures
from Survey Data: A Practical Discussion, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 1999, at 71.
72 See RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 115–19 (1997).
73 See Camp et al., Quality of Prison Operations, supra note 71, at 49–50; Scott D. Camp et al., Using
Inmate Survey Data in Assessing Prison Performance: A Case Study Comparing Private and Public Prisons,
27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 26, 31 (2002); see also GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 83.
74 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 9 (discussing TENN. SELECT OVERSIGHT COMM. ON CORR., supra note
63).
75 Not that prison audits are useless; Gerald Gaes, in fact, who is a big booster of performance
measurement, discusses how audits could be improved to be made more useful. GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at
31–37.
76 See Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 20 (discussing, in the context of ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra note
62, how a low count of disciplinary actions could indicate either good or bad performance); id. at 25–27
(discussing similar difficulties in interpreting items in LOGAN, supra note 61; Logan, supra note 61).
77 Camp & Gaes, supra note 62, at 286 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-158, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING OPERATIONAL COSTS
AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE 11 (1996)).
79 See, e.g., HARDING, supra note 72, at 158–65 (describing the “basic model” of accountability, the U.K.
model, and the Florida model, and proposing a new model); David E. Pozen, Managing a Correctional
Marketplace: Prison Privatization in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 J.L. & POL. 253, 276–81
(2003) (comparing American and British accountability systems).
80 See JON VAGG, PRISON SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE,
GERMANY, AND THE NETHERLANDS 305–07 (1994).
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experiment.81 When a prison study finds some result about comparative
quality, that tells us something about comparative quality within that
accountability structure; if a private prison performed inadequately under one
accountability structure, it might do better under a better one.82
As an example of the problems with current quality metrics, consider the
performance evaluations of the private federal Taft facility. As with the cost
studies discussed above,83 we have two competing studies, the National
Institute of Justice one by McDonald and Carlson84 and a Bureau of Prisons
study by Scott Camp and Dawn Daggett85—the companion paper to Julianne
Nelson’s cost paper.86
The Bureau of Prisons has evaluated public prisons by the Key
Indicators/Strategic Support System since 1989.87 Taft, alas, didn’t use that
system, but instead used the system designed in the contract for awarding
performance-related bonuses.88 Therefore, McDonald and Carlson could only
compare Taft’s performance with that of the public comparison prisons on a
limited number of dimensions,89 and many of these dimensions—like
accreditation of the facility, staffing levels, or frequency of seeing a doctor90—
aren’t even outcomes. Taft had lower assault rates than the average of its
comparison institutions, though they were within the range of observed assault
rates.91 No inmates or staff were killed.92 There were two escapes, which was
higher than at public prisons.93 Drug use was also higher at Taft, as was the

81 See HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div. v. Minister of Fin. ¶ 18 [2009]
(Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf; Volokh, supra note
6, at 180–85, 198–99 (discussing this opinion).
82 Gaes, supra note 36, at 30, also calls for more study of different accountability structures.
83 See supra text accompanying notes 53–57.
84 McDonald & Carlson, supra note 56.
85 SCOTT D. CAMP & DAWN M. DAGGETT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
EVALUATION OF THE TAFT DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: PERFORMANCE OF A PRIVATE-SECTOR PRISON AND THE
BOP (2005), http://149.101.37.70/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/orelappin2005.pdf.
86 NELSON, supra note 53.
87 McDonald & Carlson, supra note 56, at 119; see also infra text accompanying notes 305–06.
88 Gaes, supra note 25, at 35; infra text accompanying note 172.
89 McDonald & Carlson, supra note 56, at 119.
90 Id. at 143.
91 Id. at 126, 127 fig.4.2. To focus on the three comparison prisons from the cost analyses, Elkton’s
assault rate was similar to what would have been expected, while Taft, like Forrest City and Yazoo City, had
lower rates than what would have been expected. Gaes, supra note 25, at 36. Yazoo City’s was the lowest. Id.
92 McDonald & Carlson, supra note 56, at 128.
93 Id.
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frequency of submitting grievances.94 On this very limited analysis, Taft seems
neither clearly better nor clearly worse than its public counterparts.
The Camp and Daggett study, on the other hand, created performance
measures from inmate misconduct data,95 and concluded not only that Taft
“had higher counts than expected for most forms of misconduct, including all
types of misconduct considered together,” but also that Taft “had the largest
deviation of observed from expected values for most of the time period
examined.”96 Camp and Daggett’s performance assessment was thus more
pessimistic than McDonald and Carlson’s.97
According to Gerald Gaes, the strongest studies include one from
Tennessee, which shows essentially no difference, one from Washington,
which shows somewhat positive results,98 and three more recent studies of
federal prisons by himself and coauthors, which found public prisons to be
equivalent to private prisons on some measures, higher on others, and lower on
yet others.99
2. Which Sector Leads to Less Recidivism?
Recidivism reduction is really just one dimension of prison quality, though
it’s a particularly relevant one that deserves its own section.
If we found that inmates at private prisons were less likely to reoffend than
comparable inmates at public prisons, this would be an important factor in any
comparison of public and private prisons. Unfortunately, recidivism
comparisons haven’t been very good either.
A study from the late 1990s by Lonn Lanza-Kaduce and coauthors reported
that inmates released from private prisons were less likely to reoffend than a
matched sample of inmates released from public prisons, and they had less
serious offenses if they did reoffend.100 But this study has been critiqued on
94

Id. at 143.
CAMP & DAGGETT, supra note 85, at 35.
96 Id. at 59–60.
97 But see infra text accompanying notes 469–78 (discussing how misconduct rates can be misleading
since they depend on accurate and unbiased reporting by prison staff).
98 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 31.
99 Gaes, supra note 36, at 25–26 (citing Camp et al., Quality of Prison Operations, supra note 71; Scott
D. Camp et al., The Influence of Prisons on Inmate Misconduct: A Multilevel Investigation, 20 JUST. Q. 501
(2003); Camp et al., supra note 73).
100 See Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., A Comparative Recidivism Analysis of Releasees from Private and
Public Prisons, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 28, 36–37 (1999) [hereinafter Lanza-Kaduce et al., A Comparative
95
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various grounds.101 First, not all the recidivism measures are significant: while
various reoffense-related rates were found to be significantly lower in the
private sector,102 and while the seriousness of reoffending was found to be
significantly lower in the private sector,103 a time-to-failure analysis found that
there was no significant difference in the “length of time that a releasee
‘survived’ without an arrest during the 12-month follow-up period.”104 Second,
the public inmates seem to not really have been well matched to the private
inmates; they only seemed so when their descriptive variables were described
at a high level of generality (e.g., custody level vs. “the underlying continuous
score measuring custody level,” whether inmates had two or more
incarcerations vs. the actual number of incarcerations, etc.).105 Third, the
authors seem to have made the questionable decision to assign an inmate to the
sector he was released from, even if he had spent time in several sectors: thus,
an inmate who spent years in public prison and was transferred to private
prison shortly before his release was classified as a private prison releasee.106
Fourth, a private releasee who reoffended could take longer to be entered in the
system than a public releasee,107 so the truly comparable number of private
recidivists may well have been larger than reported.
A later study by David Farabee and Kevin Knight108 that “corrected for
some of these deficiencies”109 found no comparative difference in the reoffense
or reincarceration rates of males or juveniles over a three-year post-release
Recidivism Analysis]; see also Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., The Devil in the Details: The Case Against the Case
Study of Private Prisons, Criminological Research, and Conflict of Interest, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 92, 96–97
(2000).
101 The critiques are discussed in GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 24–26. Gaes et al. argue, see id. at 27, that
several of the critiques continue to apply to a later paper with a longer follow-up period, L. Lanza-Kaduce &
S. Maggard, The Long-Term Recidivism of Public and Private Prisoners (2001) (unpublished manuscript)
(paper presented at the National Conference of the Bureau of Justice Statistics and Justice Research and
Statistics Association, New Orleans, 2001).
102 See Lanza-Kaduce et al., A Comparative Recidivism Analysis, supra note 100. The difference in
rearrest rates is significant at the 1% level and the difference in resentencing rates is significant at the 5%
level, but the differences in reincarceration rates and for any indication of recidivism are only significant at the
10% level. Id. at 37.
103 Id. at 37–38.
104 Id. at 38–41.
105 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 25 (citing FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., BUR. OF RES. & DATA ANALYSIS,
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF A STUDY ENTITLED “A COMPARATIVE RECIDIVISM ANALYSIS OF RELEASEES
FROM PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS IN FLORIDA” (1998)).
106 Id. at 26.
107 Id.
108 DAVID FARABEE & KEVIN KNIGHT, A COMPARISON OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRISONS IN FLORIDA:
DURING- AND POST-PRISON PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (2002).
109 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 27.
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period, though women had lower recidivism in the private sector.110 However,
this study may still suffer from the problem of the attribution of inmates who
spent some time in each sector, as well as possible selection bias to the extent
that private prisons got a different type of inmate than public prisons did.111
Another study by William Bales and coauthors,112 even more rigorous,113
likewise found no statistically significant difference between public-inmate
and private-inmate recividism.114
A more recent study, by Andrew Spivak and Susan Sharp, reported that
private prisons were (statistically) significantly worse in six out of eight
models tested.115 But the authors noted that some skepticism was in order
before concluding that public prisons necessarily did better on recidivism.116
Populations aren’t randomly assigned to public and private prisons: that private
prisons engage in “cream-skimming” is a persistent complaint.117 Recall the
case in Arizona, where the Department of Corrections made “an effort to
refrain from assigning prisoners to [the private Marana Community
Correctional Facility] if they [had] serious or chronic medical problems,
110

FARABEE & KNIGHT, supra note 108, at ii–iii, 20–25.
GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 28.
112 William D. Bales et al., Recidivism of Public and Private State Prison Inmates in Florida,
4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 57 (2005).
113 See Gaes, supra note 36, at 9.
114 Bales et al., supra note 112, at 69, 72, 74.
115 Andrew L. Spivak & Susan F. Sharp, Inmate Recidivism as a Measure of Private Prison Performance,
54 CRIME & DELINQ. 482, 500 tbl.5, 501 (2008).
116 See id. at 503.
117 See, e.g., ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., REVISED FY 2009 OPERATING PER CAPITA COST REPORT 2, 4 (2010)
(discussing inmates “returned to state prisons due to an increase of their medical scores that exceeds
contractual exclusions”); id. at 10 (explaining that “[m]edical, dental and mental health treatment is provided
but to a healthier inmate population based upon contractual criteria resulting in lower overall medical costs”);
id. at 12–16 (discussing medical, mental health, and other restrictions on inmates that can be sent to particular
private prisons); ARIZ. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., REPORT NO. 10-08, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS—
PRISON POPULATION GROWTH 20 (2010) (“[P]rivate prisons do not accept inmates in need of more serious
medical care . . . .”); GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 28; John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A Critical
Perspective on the Private Management of Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
supra note 25, at 155, 166–67 (stating that private firms “engage in correctional creaming when they bid,”
meaning that they avoid bidding on facilities that they expect will “bring negative media attention, legislative
inquiries, staff unrest, lawsuits, and judicial intervention”—that is, “the Atticas and Rikers Islands of the
country”); Dolovich, supra note 5, at 505; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in
Savings, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011, at A1 (discussing Arizona Department of Corrections study stating that
private prisons “often house only relatively healthy inmates” and quoting State Representative Chad Campbell
calling this practice “cherry-picking”). But see Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 34–35 (stressing that the federal
Taft facility, the subject of the comparative study reported supra text accompanying notes 53–59, 83–94, will
house inmates equivalent to those at the comparison facilities).
111
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serious psychiatric problems, or [were] deemed to be unlikely to benefit from
the substance abuse program that [was] provided at the facility.”118 But the
phenomenon can also run the other way. One of the authors of the recidivism
study, Andrew Spivak, writes that while he was “a case manager at a mediumsecurity public prison in Oklahoma in 1998, he noted an inclination for case
management staff (himself included) to use transfer requests to private prisons
as a method for removing more troublesome inmates from case loads.”119
Moreover, recidivism data is itself often flawed.120 Recidivism has to be
not only proved (which requires good databases) but also defined.121
Recidivism isn’t self-defining—it could include arrest; reconviction;
incarceration; or parole violation, suspension, or revocation; and it could give
different weights to different offenses depending on their seriousness.122
Which definition one uses makes a difference in one’s conclusions about
correctional effectiveness,123 as well as affecting the scope of innovation.124
The choice of how long to monitor obviously matters as well: “[m]ost severe
offences occur in the second and third year after release.”125 Recidivism
measures might also vary because of variations in, say, enforcement of parole
conditions, independent of the true recidivism of the underlying population.126
The study of the comparative recidivism of the public and private sector
could thus use a lot of improvement.127

118

THOMAS, supra note 23, at 73; see supra text accompanying note 64.
Spivak & Sharp, supra note 115, at 503–04.
120 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 78, at 29–31 (discussing SECHREST & SHICHOR, supra
note 69) (“Sufficient data were not available to adequately complete the analysis comparing the inmates
released from the community correctional facilities to inmates released from other correctional institutions in
the state.”); MICHAEL D. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM 58–60 (1984); Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 7.
121 See Brakel & Gaylord, supra note 10, at 154.
122 MALTZ, supra note 120, at 62; see ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS, ASCA PERFORMANCE-BASED
MEASURES SYSTEM COUNTING RULES 15–24 (2013), available at http://www.asca.net/system/assets/
attachments/5685/PBMS%20KeyIndicators%204_3_13.pdf.
123 MALTZ, supra note 120, at 63; see also JAMES DICKER, 2020 PUB. SERVS. TRUST AT THE RSA, CASE
STUDY 2, PAYMENT-BY-OUTCOME IN OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 16 (2011) (“[N]either reconviction nor reimprisonment rates capture all re-offending behaviour, as only about 45% of offenders who are reconvicted are
incarcerated and it is possible to be recalled to prison for breaching license conditions without being
reconvicted.”).
124 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 18.
125 Id. at 16–17.
126 See MALTZ, supra note 120, at 66–67.
127 See Gaes, supra note 36, at 9–11 (discussing these studies).
119
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C. The Limits of Comparative Effectiveness
After having read the foregoing, one should be fairly dismayed at the state
of comparative public-private prison research.128 In fact, it gets worse. An
overarching problem is that most studies don’t simultaneously compare both
cost and quality. It is hard to draw strong conclusions from such studies, even
if they are state-of-the-art at what they are examining.129
If we find that a private prison costs less, how do we know that it did not
achieve that result by cutting quality? (This is the standard critique of private
prisons.)130 If we find that a private prison costs more, how do we know that it
did not cost more because of the fancy and expensive educational or
rehabilitative programs it implemented?131 (According to Douglas McDonald,
this was exactly the problem with the cost comparison of the Silverdale
Detention Center in Hamilton County, Tennessee.)132
Our goal should be to determine the production function for public and
private prisons; this is the only way we will find out whether privatization
moves us to a higher production possibilities frontier or merely shifts us to a

128 Some studies are actually meta-analyses. See Gaes, supra note 36, at 3–6 (discussing meta-analyses
and literature reviews). Two recent meta-analyses showed little difference between the public and private
sectors. One, only analyzing costs, found no statistical difference between the public and private sectors. See
Travis C. Pratt & Jeff Maahs, Are Private Prisons More Cost-Effective Than Public Prisons? A Meta-Analysis
of Evaluation Research Studies, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 358, 365, 366 tbl.2 (1999). Another, looking at both cost
and quality, found that the private sector was both slightly cheaper and slightly worse; but with such small
effects, the authors concluded that “prison privatization provides neither a clear advantage nor disadvantage.”
See Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization: A Meta-Analysis of Cost and Quality of Confinement
Indicators, 19 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 383, 392 (2009). A third—more a literature review than a metaanalysis—reported that the comparison was “inconclusive,” Dina Perrone & Travis C. Pratt, Comparing the
Quality of Confinement and Cost-Effectiveness of Public Versus Private Prisons: What We Know, Why We Do
Not Know More, and Where to Go from Here, 83 PRISON J. 301, 301 (2003); and in any event there was no
formal attempt to control for differences between the public and private prisons compared. See id. at 306.
Given that many of the underlying studies are flawed in various ways, it’s not clear how you do better
by aggregating them. When studies done in vastly different ways and subject to different sources of bias are
aggregated in a meta-analysis, the results are “garbage in, garbage out.”
129 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 78, at 13; see also Simon Hakim & Erwin A.
Blackstone, Cost Analysis of Public and Contractor-Operated Prisons 4, 11 (Apr. 29, 2013) (unpublished
working paper) (finding long-run cost savings between 12% and 59% but devoting scarcely any attention to
quality).
130 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 5, at 474–80 (discussing the economic incentives inherent to private
prison management for saving money by reducing overall quality of service).
131 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 34–35; Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons,
supra note 9, at 1875–78.
132 See McDonald, supra note 25, at 91.
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different cost-quality combination on the existing frontier.133 Realizing this
allows us to throw out a lot of studies from the outset.
At least people are taking more seriously the need to develop valid
comparisons. Governments need to mandate, by regulation or by contract, that
the information necessary to do valid comparisons become available, even if
collecting these extra data would add to private facilities’ cost.134 Until we get
a better handle on what works, public and private prisons should be required to
live up to the same standards to facilitate comparisons. Private prisons should
get the same types of inmates as public prisons—neither better nor worse135—
and they should be restricted in whom they can transfer out.136
Having spent so long bemoaning the paucity of good comparative
effectiveness studies, I should note that there’s more to life than comparative
effectiveness. Even ignoring any differences between the public and private
sectors, privatization can have systemic effects, altering how the public sector
works.137
For one thing, privatization can, for better or worse, change the public
sector as well. Suppose private prisons are better than public prisons but
competitive pressures lead public prisons to improve as well.138 A comparative
study may not be able to find any difference between the two sectors, and yet
one can still say that privatization was a success.139 (Indeed, one study does
133 Cf. Caroline M. Hoxby, School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States,
SWEDISH ECON. POL’Y REV., no. 2, 2003, at 9, 42 (“If school choice is to be public policy, and not merely an
experiment, then the question we need to answer is whether students’ achievement would rise if they attended
voucher or charter schools that had resources like those available to them in regular public schools. In other
words, we should ask the achievement question, holding resources constant (as well as holding students’
ability, motivation, and other characteristics constant).”).
134 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 26, at 5, 13–14, 17, 19–20, 30.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 117–19.
136 See OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, STATE OF FLA., REPORT NO.
95-12, REVIEW OF CORRECTIONAL PRIVATIZATION 4 (1995) (recommending restrictions on transfers out of
private prisons).
137 Cf. Hoxby, supra note 133, at 19 (noting that “[school] choice can affect productivity through a variety
of long-term, general equilibrium mechanisms that are not immediately available to an administrator,” like
bidding up the wages of successful teachers and altering the mix of people who choose teaching as a career,
making parents into more informed consumers by encouraging the spread of information about schools,
altering what curricula are adopted, and the like).
138 See Charles W. Thomas, Correctional Privatization in America: An Assessment of Its Historical
Origins, Present Status, and Future Prospects, in CHANGING THE GUARD, supra note 10, at 57, 59; see also
infra Part II.A (discussing how privatization can improve accountability of the public sector).
139 Cf. Hoxby, supra note 133, at 43 (suggesting that concentrating on the effect on student achievement
of private schooling vs. public schooling is wrongheaded in the school choice debate because school choice
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suggest that for prisons, privatization might drive public agencies to be more
efficient,140 though the statistical significance of this effect seems highly
sensitive to the precise specification,141 and selection bias is a confounding
issue.142) Similarly, if private prisons really do cost less, and therefore allow
for greater increases in capacity, thus relieving overcrowding across the board,
that effect will not show up in a comparative study.143 Likewise if best
practices migrate from one sector to another through a process of crossfertilization144: Richard Harding calls this “the paradox of successful crossfertilization—that regimes progressively become more similar than dissimilar
to each other.”145
Alternatively, what if privatization leads to a race to the bottom? If private
prison cost-cutting is harmful, and if public prisons have to cut costs to stay
competitive, we may have lower quality, including higher recidivism, across
the board.146

can be a success if, through competition, it leads to improvements in the public sector, so that there never
emerges any difference between public and private school outcomes).
140 See James F. Blumstein et al., Do Government Agencies Respond to Market Pressures? Evidence from
Private Prisons, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 446, 454 (2008); see also JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN & MARK A.
COHEN, THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRISONS: DOES THE EXISTENCE OF
PRISONERS UNDER PRIVATE MANAGEMENT AFFECT THE RATE OF GROWTH IN EXPENDITURES ON PRISONERS
UNDER PUBLIC MANAGEMENT? 1 (2003) (concluding that “states that have some of their prisoners in privately
owned or operated prisons experience lower growth in the cost of housing their public prisoners”).
141 See Blumstein et al., supra note 140, at 465 (finding an insignificant effect with two different
specifications but a significant effect with a third).
142 The authors estimate the effect using a two-stage regression where the first stage represents the
probability of privatizing, but this method doesn’t always take care of selection effects. See Alexander Volokh,
Do Faith-Based Prisons Work?, 63 ALA. L. REV. 43, 67–73 (2011). Gaes also critiques the study. See Gaes,
supra note 36, at 12–14. I have discussed or critiqued selection bias in many places. See Alexander Volokh,
Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 803–
19 (2008); Volokh, supra note 9, at 1245–47; Alexander Volokh, Privatization, Free Riding, and IndustryExpanding Lobbying, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 62, 68 (2010) [hereinafter Volokh, Privatization, Free
Riding]; Alexander Volokh, The Effect of Privatization on Public and Private Prison Lobbies, in 3 PRISON
PRIVATIZATION: THE MANY FACETS OF A CONTROVERSIAL INDUSTRY 7, 24–26 (Byron Eugene Price & John
Charles Morris eds., 2012) [hereinafter Volokh, The Effect of Privatization].
143 Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 9, at 1875.
144 I discuss cross-fertilization at greater length below. See infra text accompanying note 194.
145 Richard Harding, Private Prisons, in 28 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 265, 334
(2001). But see Tony Ward, Book Review, 3 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 125, 126 (1999) (reviewing
HARDING, supra note 72) (conceding that Harding’s cross-fertilization argument is valid but noting that
“[t]here seems to be a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ quality to [Harding’s cross-fertilization] argument (if public
prisons turn out to be better than private ones, that just proves that competition is good for them!)”).
146 See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 108; HARDING, supra note 72, at 138 (noting that reductions in
public prisons’ staffing levels in response to competition could be alternatively characterized as “crossfertilization” or “industrial blackmail” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gerald G. Gaes, Reaction Essay,
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In either of these two cases, good empirical evaluations are necessary,
though detecting such dynamic, systemwide effects will require before-andafter studies, not comparative snapshots.
Finally, to step back a bit from the privatization debate, regardless of what
comparative effectiveness analysis shows, both sectors may fall short of the
ideal, so this exercise should not blind us to the continuing need to reform the
whole system.147 I will add that, even if the public and private sectors are
equivalent, one can argue against privatization on the grounds that—assuming
it costs less—it enables greater expansion of the prison system and therefore
may increase incarceration and hinder the search for alternative penal
policies.148
II. WHY USE PERFORMANCE MEASURES?
A. The Puzzle of Prisons?
The moral so far is that the whole empirical literature on public and private
prisons is inconclusive.149 As I noted in the Introduction, this should be
somewhat of a puzzle for activists on both sides who claim that privatization
should turn prisons into either humanitarian disaster zones or models of quality
and efficiency.150
Of course, that the empirical literature is inconclusive doesn’t mean the
sectors are equivalent; it means that current methods haven’t been good
enough to detect the difference. A methodologically deficient literature could
hide evidence of either good or bad quality. But if the differences are great
enough, you’d think they might show through even with bad methods.151
The tentative conclusion I draw from the literature, though, is that there
may be modest, but not huge, quality differences between the sectors; the
public sector is better on some dimensions and worse on others, and there’s no
good evidence that either sector does better at reducing recidivism. And while

Prison Privatization in Florida: Promise, Premise, and Performance, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 83, 87
(2005).
147 See Dolovich, supra note 5, at 442.
148 See Volokh, supra note 6, at 142–43 & n.30 (collecting sources making this argument).
149 See also Alexander Volokh, The Modest Effect of Minneci v. Pollard on Inmate Litigants, 46 AKRON
L. REV. 287, 324 (2013).
150 See supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
151 See supra note 12.
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the private sector is probably cheaper, it remains to be seen whether the cost
savings is on the order of 15% (respectable) or on the order of 3% (somewhat
negligible).152
But this puzzle largely disappears when we consider the institutional
environment of private prisons. In many areas, the private sector has been good
at delivering better results at a lower cost. This is because private producers are
accountable to customers who care about the quality of the end product, and
because they have the flexibility to change how they do things in response to
problems they may encounter. Neither of these conditions is true for private
prisons—not even slightly, not even as a first approximation.
I have noted above that there is limited evidence of private firm
innovation.153 But this is because private prisons are highly constrained in how
they operate. Private prison contracts essentially “‘governmentalize’ the
private sector,”154 reproducing public prison regulations in the private contract.
Privatization can come to resemble an exercise in who can better pretend to be
a public prison.155
For instance, back in 1985, Robert Levinson complained of a contract with
the Eckerd Foundation for the management of the Okeechobee School for
Boys in which “[v]irtually every” contract item
concerned input activities and pertained to administrative/operational
functions. Thus, Eckerd could have been in total compliance with all
contractual provisions even if every released client committed a new
offense on the first day in the community. Moreover, at no point in

152

See supra text accompanying notes 53–57.
See, e.g., Camp & Gaes, supra note 62, at 287 (“In most of the literature in favor of
privatization, . . . little or no detail is offered as to how . . . market pressures actually translate into real
differences between public and private prisons . . . .”); Scott D. Camp, Editorial Introduction to Colloquy,
Private Prisons & Recidivism, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 55, 55 (2005) (stating that “little specific
information is provided about why” private prison releasees should have lower recidivism); Dolovich, supra
note 5, at 476 (noting that “[t]here is . . . little evidence of cost-saving innovation in private-sector prisons”).
154 Thomas, supra note 138, at 64; see also id. at 82, 100–02, 116 n.15.
155 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 49; Durham, supra note 20, at 67; Gaes et al., supra note 60,
at 12 (“Generally speaking, the contract [discussed in THOMAS, supra note 23] stipulates that [the private
provider] run the . . . facility in a manner similar to that in which the state would have operated the prison.”);
id. at 17 (“Basically, the State of Arizona has taken the position that a private contractor should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate it can [outperform] the state in running an Arizona prison according to Arizona
Department of Corrections policy.”); Harding, supra note 145, at 303; Douglas McDonald & Carl Patten, Jr.,
Governments’ Management of Private Prisons 18 (Sept. 15, 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203968.pdf.
153
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the contract were the criteria for noncompliance stated nor its
156
consequences specified.

More recently, in Arizona, an auditor general report stated,
The Department requires that private prisons mirror state-operated
facilities, and performs extensive oversight activities to ensure that its
contractors meet its requirements. In order to maintain uniform
standards for state and private prisons, the Department requires
contractors to follow Department Orders, Director’s Instructions,
Technical Manuals, Institution Orders, and Post Orders. These
requirements extend to specific details, such as following the same
daily menus as state-operated facilities. Contractors may request
waivers from the Department for policies that are not applicable to
private prisons, such as state fiscal management practices, employee
157
evaluations, and employee benefits.

The same daily menus! In Tennessee, “it even appears that private sector
innovation was deliberately thwarted by making the private sector
provider . . . abide by [state Department of Corrections] policy” in running the
facility.158
Subjecting private contractors to public regulations is actually quite
common;159 one exception to this trend is Florida, where public and private
prisons are controlled by different agencies,160 and the agency that regulates
private prisons tries to balance “setting policy and encouraging innovation.”161
More generally, input specification in private-prison contracts is routine,
though of course the level of inputs specified can (and should) be “outputdriven” in the sense that it’s “related to output objectives.”162 For instance, one
156 Levinson, supra note 24, at 87; see also id. at 88 (noting that “close, coordinated monitoring of the
contract by the state” may be precluded by “vague or nonexistent contract goals”).
157 DEBRA K. DAVENPORT, ARIZ. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., REPORT NO. 01-13, ARIZONA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS: PRIVATE PRISONS 9 (2001); see also Thomas, supra note 138, at 101.
158 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 10.
159 CAMP & GAES, supra note 23, at vii (“[P]rivate contractors were typically obligated to use the training
standards and policies of the public agencies.”); see also id. at 28. But see id. at ix (“[T]he private sector, even
when there is no contractual obligation, has adopted the standards and policies of their public sector
counterparts.”); see also id. at 32.
160 Id. at x, 32–33; see also HARDING, supra note 72, at 161.
161 CAMP & GAES, supra note 23, at x; see also Harding, supra note 145, at 303–04 (noting a similar
situation in Western Australia).
162 HARDING, supra note 72, at 67–68 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Peter H. Kyle, Note,
Contracting for Performance: Restructuring the Private Prison Market, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2087, 2111
(2013) (“[S]ome states have started to require the provision of vocational services . . . .”). Harding does not
distinguish between outputs and outcomes, see supra text accompanying note 17, so when he refers to outputs

VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

1/21/2014 4:05 PM

PRISON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

367

can find liquidated damages provisions for certain input-based breaches like
not complying with the state’s policies or not filling certain required
positions.163
If inputs and procedures are highly regulated, it’s not surprising that the
evidence for private-sector improvements isn’t overwhelming. The market is a
discovery process; one shouldn’t expect different methods to emerge unless
innovation is permitted.
And not only permitted: one shouldn’t expect different methods to emerge
unless the incentives favor it. If the premise of privatization is that incentives
work, particularly given the greater flexibility of private industry,
micromanaging inputs and failing to incorporate the full range of desirable
outcomes into the contract price means giving up on much of the possible
benefit of privatization.
But the efforts to measure performance in various areas of government
from the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982164 and the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993165—and the limited efforts to make
funding contingent on those performance measures166—have largely passed
prisons by.
Outcome measures aren’t totally absent. Contracts do include a limited
range of outcome measures—for instance, limited penalties for escapes.167 But

here, he means something like outcomes. Harding also suggests “intermediate outputs” as a synonym for
“output-driven inputs,” HARDING, supra note72, at 67–68 (internal quotation marks omitted); perhaps this
concept is close to what I refer to as simply “outputs.” See RADIN, supra note 17, at 15 (defining “output” and
“intermediate outcome” differently).
163 See Leonard Gilroy, Innovators in Action 2012: Creating a Culture of Competition to Improve
Corrections, REASON FOUND. (May 31, 2012), http://reason.org/news/show/1012923.html.
164 Pub. L. No. 97-300, § 106(b)(1), 96 Stat. 1322, 1333, repealed by Workforce Investment Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-220, § 199(b)(2), 112 Stat. 936, 1059 (providing that permissible performance measures for
job-training organizations include “(A) placement in unsubsidized employment, (B) retention in unsubsidized
employment, (C) the increase in earnings, including hourly wages, and (D) reduction in the number of
individuals and families receiving cash welfare payments and the amounts of such payments”).
165 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 31 U.S.C.); see
Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Requiring Bureaucracies to Perform: What Have We Learned from the U.S.
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)?, POLITIQUES ET MGMT. PUB., June 1999, at 1, 3; Matthew
S. Schoen, Note, Good Enough for Government Work?: The Government Performance Results Act of 1993
and Its Impact on Federal Agencies, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 455, 467 (2008).
166 See infra Part III.C.1.
167 See, e.g., Tennessee CCA 2007 contract, supra note 67, § A.4.x.2 (“In the event of an escape resulting
in whole or part from Contractor’s failure to perform pursuant to the provisions of this Contract, the State may
seek damages in a court of competent jurisdiction.”). Note that there’s no provision for paying for escapes not
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by and large, outcome-based compensation is rare.168 And to the extent there
are outcome-based rewards or penalties, Charles Thomas argues, “the amounts
involved commonly have little or no correlation with the true magnitude of
what independent contractors accomplished or failed to accomplish,” and “the
dollar value of the reward or sanction is often too trivial to encourage superior
performance or to deter defective performance.”169 (Of course this isn’t always
true: the state of Ohio recently fined CCA nearly $500,000 for contract
violations found during audits, and many of these violations were
performance-relevant.)170 Even developing outcome measures hasn’t been a
high priority.171
In 1998—not that long ago—Douglas McDonald and his coauthors
identified two exceptional cases of performance-based compensation: the
“Bureau of Prisons’ contract with Wackenhut for the operation of the Taft
Correctional Institution in California,” which allowed for “an award-fee
incentive worth up to 5 percent of paid invoices,” and a District of Columbia
contract with CCA for the Correctional Treatment Facility, “which permit[ted]
financial rewards for meeting targets based on performance indicators.”172
Florida recently would have taken a good step in this direction, if the bill in
question173 hadn’t been defeated. The bill would have required that private
prison contracts make provision for measuring a number of dimensions of
performance (though note that some of these are output measures): number of
batteries, number of major disciplinary reports, percentage of negative random
drug tests, number of escapes, percentage of inmates in “a facility that provides
at least one of the inmate’s primary program needs,” and so on.174 The number
of escapes also showed up in a more specific way: the contractor would have

stemming from nonperformance—the contractor need only “exercise its best efforts to prevent escapes.” See
id. § A.4.x.1.
168 See Kenneth L. Avio, The Economics of Prisons, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 143, 150 (1998); Pozen, supra
note 79, at 282–83; Thomas, supra note 138, at 107 (“[I]f there are contracts that include product-oriented
requirements that go beyond mere evidence of participation, then they are contracts I have never read.”).
169 Thomas, supra note 138, at 109.
170 See Unique Private Prison Deal Leads to Backlash, CORRECTIONAL NEWS (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.
correctionalnews.com/articles/2013/03/6/unique-private-prison-deal-leads-backlash.
171 See Durham, supra note 20, at 67.
172 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 52. “Wackenhut Corrections Corp. changed its name to The
GEO Group in November 2003 under the terms of a share purchase agreement with another company.”
Volokh, supra note 9, at 1229 n.131.
173 S.B. 2038, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012), available at http://flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2012/2038/
BillText/e1/PDF.
174 Id. sec. 1, § 944.7115(8)(f)(1)(a)–(r).
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been required to reimburse the state for the costs of escapes.175 The Florida bill
also listed required various performance measures for work release centers.176
(I discuss various other performance measures below.)177
The following sections develop these themes and discuss two distinct
benefits of using performance measures. The first set of advantages of using
performance measures, discussed in section B, is a pure accountability
advantage: we, as citizens and policymakers, would know how well our
prisons are doing; we’d be better informed in deciding which sector to choose,
either systemwide or on discrete projects; and we could think more clearly
about what prisons should be doing. The second type of advantage, discussed
in section C, goes more to harnessing incentives to improve the system over
time: incorporating performance measures into contracts, and tying providers’
compensation to how well they do, would give providers a reason to care about
quality and simultaneously let us grant them greater flexibility. Section D
discusses the normative issues involved in choosing the actual measures.
B. Accountability, Neutrality, and Goal Setting
1. To Know What Works
We all want to improve prisons. But forget about that for a moment. Even
before any of these improvements were possible, performance measures would
have the obvious effect of allowing us to measure performance. This would be
a great step forward in researchers’ ability to conduct quality studies. We
would have a better sense of which sector provides better quality; combine that
with better cost studies that take into account the pitfalls described above,178
and we’d be better able to decide whether to be one of the nineteen states that
(as of 2011) don’t have private prisons.179 If we do decide not to use private
prisons, performance measures would help us determine which public prisons
performed badly and where to look for improvement.180
175

Id. sec. 1, § 944.7115(11).
These were “(a) The percent of employment of supervised individuals; (b) The illegal substance use by
supervised individuals; (c) The victim restitution paid by supervised individuals; (d) Compliance by supervised
individuals with no-contact orders; (e) The number of serious incidents occurring at the facility; and (f) The
number of absconders.” Id. sec. 1, § 944.7115(8)(f)(2)(a)–(f).
177 See infra Part II.D.
178 See supra Part I.A.
179 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
180 See Aloysius Bavon, Innovations in Performance Measurement Systems: A Comparative Perspective,
18 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 491, 493, 502 (1995) (discussing how performance measurement arose as a result of
176
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2. To Implement Competitive Neutrality
Suppose we decide not to use private prisons. Should we then contract out
the entire prison system? Probably not: someone has to be able to run a facility
if the current contractor has fallen down on the job or gone bankrupt,181 and
given how concentrated the private prison industry currently is,182 it may not
always be realistic to count on being able to easily bring in a competitor when
this happens.
How much of the system, then, should we privatize? The standard way to
proceed is to choose particular prisons to privatize and put them up to bid to
private firms, or to contract with private firms to use their own prisons. A more
beneficial approach, though, would be to have a regime of “competitive
neutrality,” where the public and private sector compete on the same
projects.183 The best system may be one of mixed public and private
management, where private programs “complement existing public programs
rather than replace them.”184 (Health care reformers’ advocacy of the “public
option” in health insurance was premised on a similar idea: that public
participation can make competition more fair by disciplining private providers
more than they would discipline each other.)185
For instance, Gary Mohr, director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction, has talked about creating a “culture of competition” in
corrections.186 Ohio has pursued a combination of outsourcing and insourcing:
some public prisons have been sold or their management has been contracted

the perceived inefficiency of the public sector); Marc Holzer & Arie Halachmi, Measurement as a Means of
Accountability, 19 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1921, 1922 (1996) (arguing that measurement improves
accountability of the public sector).
181 See HARDING, supra note 72, at 158 (“The state must in the last resort be able to reclaim private
prisons.”); Michael J. Gilbert, How Much Is Too Much Privatization in Criminal Justice?, in PRIVATIZATION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 41, 76–77.
182 Volokh, supra note 9, at 1237–38.
183 See WILLIAM D. EGGERS, REASON PUB. POL’Y INST., HOW-TO GUIDE NO. 18, COMPETITIVE
NEUTRALITY: ENSURING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD IN MANAGED COMPETITIONS 6 (1998); Gaes, supra note 36,
at 24.
184 Patrick Anderson et al., Private Corrections: Feast or Fiasco?, PRISON J., Oct. 1985, at 32, 38.
185 See JACOB S. HACKER, THE CASE FOR PUBLIC PLAN CHOICE IN NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM: KEY TO
COST CONTROL AND QUALITY COVERAGE 1–2 (2008), http://ourfuture.org/report/case-public-plan-choicenational-health-reform; see also WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 217 (1971) (“In the 1930’s, the primary case for the creation of public power authorities was to
provide a ‘yardstick’ with which to evaluate private electric utility monopolies.”).
186 Gilroy, supra note 163.
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out to the private sector, while one private prison has been taken in-house.187
The result, according to Mohr, is that one can “ratchet[] up the best practices
that can be created from both the public sector and multiple private
vendors.”188
But for this sort of system to work, we have to be able to fairly compare
private-sector and public-sector bids before the fact. The cross-fertilization
that’s supposed to result from competitive neutrality depends on flexibility,
otherwise both sectors will try to do the same thing. But, without performance
measures, flexibility undermines the ability to do the comparative analysis of
bids that’s necessary to successfully implement cross-fertilization; the most
straightforward way of making efficiency comparisons without performance
measures is to mandate that the private sector replicate every public-sector
procedure, down to the tiniest detail. And indeed, this is what Mohr did when
contracting out the management of the North Central Correctional Complex
facility to the private sector or when selling the Lake Erie Correctional
Institution.189
But with performance measures—and with an understanding of how
proposed programs and methods translate into performance—he would have
been able to take different proposals, translate them into expected
performance, and thus have a basis for comparison, even if the proposals were
radically dissimilar.190 (The beliefs about expected performance would then
have to be verified by evaluating the winning contractor’s performance after
the fact.)
In particular, recall the problems involved in figuring out the public
sector’s true costs191: the same problems can make for unfair competitions if
public providers’ bids don’t include the costs they bear that are paid for by

187

Id.
Id.
189 See id. (“[I]n the [request for proposals], . . . . we replicated the post assignments and the staffing
pattern and the policies and the food requirements. We basically said, ‘you must identify a minimum of a 5
percent savings’ from exactly the cost of what it has cost us to operate North Central.”); see also id. (noting
that “it was the same process” with Lake Erie Correctional Institution).
190 Ohio actually has performance metrics, which are a combination of output and outcome measures,
covering “everything from violence indicators, to use of force indicators, to program completion indicators
(GED, etc.), to recidivism data.” Id. But they apparently weren’t used in the way described above.
191 See supra Part I.A.1.
188
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other departments, their different tax treatment, and the like.192 So it’s not
surprising that such a regime is rare in the United States.193
One of the advantages of competitive neutrality is that—as in Ohio—
prisons can be both outsourced and insourced at different times, depending on
who wins the contract, so particular prisons can “churn” between the public
and private sectors. The result, according to Richard Harding, would be a
“process of positive cross-fertilization,”194 where best practices migrate from
one sector to another.195 “[T]he opening up of the private sector,” Harding
writes, “may heighten awareness of how sloppy public accountability has often
been in the past, leading to the creation of innovative mechanisms applicable to
both the private and the public sectors.”196 In fact, Harding argues, systemic
improvement has been one of the best consequences of privatization,197 so
narrowly focusing on which sector is better in a static sense is almost beside
the point.198

192

See EGGERS, supra note 183, at 1, 8–11.
See Thomas, supra note 138, at 81, 86 (“I am aware of no example in the United States that reveals
fair competition between public and private providers of correctional services. Until both of those policy
failures are corrected, achieving many of the potential benefits of privatization will be impossible.”); cf.
Harding, supra note 145, at 334 (explaining that such competition is also rare in Australia and the U.K.).
194 HARDING, supra note 72, at 115; accord id. at 162; Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons,
supra note 9, at 1890–91; Gilroy, supra note 163.
195 Joanna Saul, Executive Director of Ohio’s Correction Institution Inspection Committee, takes a
different view, stating that churning
193

would actually be horrific in practical application. The transition of prisons from public to private
has been very difficult, with negative effects up to a year or more later. Private personnel have
been very confused (or just ignorant) about the implementation of Ohio policies, which resulted
in the really bad audit that they had at Lake Erie in Nov[ember]/Dec[ember] 2012. Further, the
displacement of the public employees to other prisons caused a negative ripple effect across the
system that will continue far into the future [because] people lost their seniority [and] the
positions they had worked for, they came from different prison cultures, etc.
Comments on a draft of this Article from Joanna Saul, Exec. Dir., Ohio Corr. Inst. Inspection Comm., to
Alexander Volokh, Assoc. Professor, Emory Law School (Aug. 31, 2013). Perhaps Harding’s pro-churning
and Saul’s anti-churning views can be reconciled: too much churning may be more trouble than it’s worth,
since one will always incur transition costs when transferring a prison to new management. But the knowledge
that churning might happen—that is, that a company could lose the contract to operate a prison—can exert
beneficial competitive pressure.
196 HARDING, supra note 72, at 22–23.
197 See Harding, supra note 145, at 272–73, 331–36.
198 There remains the fear that, instead of systemwide improvement through cross-fertilization, we’ll get a
race to the bottom, as Gaes worries. See supra text accompanying note 146. But good performance measures
help avoid that problem.
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3. To Express What We Want
Measuring performance would do more than just let us know which sector
is better and promote cross-fertilization by facilitating a competitive neutrality
regime. On an even higher level, it would encourage governments to better
conceptualize what makes for a good prison—an exercise that’s long
overdue.199
Jon Vagg, for instance, argues that, in the U.K., private prisons “were a key
factor in persuading the administration that standards were necessary, if only
for the purpose of monitoring contractual compliance.”200 And that example
isn’t just a fluke. Prisons have been operating for centuries,201 and yet it was
the experience of privatization that spurred the development of performance
measures, as private-prison critics made arguments that privatization harmed
quality and private-prison advocates made arguments to the contrary.202 Now
that performance measures exist, one can use them to evaluate both the private
and the public sectors, to the benefit of both.
C. For Performance-Based Contracting
With performance measures, we can go further than just knowing how
good public and private prisons are, implementing competitive neutrality, and
formulating the proper goals of the prison system—important as all that is. We
can also incorporate the performance measures into contracts and make
compensation contingent on performance, finally giving prison providers
strong incentives to deliver high quality.
1. Limited Current Efforts
Performance-based compensation is being implemented in the United
States to a very limited extent. As noted above,203 5% of the contract price at
199 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 6 (“[P]ayment-by-outcome . . . compels commissioners to state
explicitly the goals of policy.”).
200 VAGG, supra note 80, at 307.
201 See, e.g., G. GELTNER, THE MEDIEVAL PRISON: A SOCIAL HISTORY (2008); RALPH B. PUGH,
IMPRISONMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1968); Edward M. Peters, Prison Before the Prison: The Ancient and
Medieval Worlds, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN
SOCIETY 3 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
202 See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at xi, 153, 180; HARDING, supra note 72, at 22; cf. NISKANEN, supra
note 185, at 217 (“[T]he case for the private supply of some public services is . . . to provide a yardstick to
evaluate the performance of budget-maximizing monopoly bureaus.”).
203 See supra text accompanying note 172.
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the Bureau of Prisons’ Taft facility was performance-based. Taft was a
demonstration project, which should give one a sense of how new this
enterprise is.204
The U.K. is now on the forefront of performance-based compensation,
which it calls “[p]ayment-by-outcome” or “payment-by-results.”205 The idea
was floated in a 2008 Conservative Party Green Paper206 and, once the
Conservative Party came into power, it was developed in a 2010 Green Paper
from the Ministry of Justice.207 Payment-by-results is being introduced in three
prisons: two private prisons, Peterborough208 and Doncaster,209 and a public
prison, Leeds,210 though the plan is to extend the model to all prisons by
2015.211 The measure is the twelve-month reconviction rate,212 compared to a
matched comparison group. At Peterborough, performance-based “[p]ayments
start when the reconviction rate of the intervention group is 7.5% less than that
of the matched comparison group, with increasing returns up to a maximum
rate of 13%.”213 “The Peterborough pilot is the first in the world where private
investors have assumed financial risk for reducing re-offending.”214 In addition
to having access to a range of prison programs to prevent recidivism, offenders
at Doncaster are assigned case managers to support them during their sentence
and after release, offering advice and help on employment, housing, and
benefits issues.215 (Earlier experience with payment-by-results was “primarily
204 Also, in Kansas, Senate Bill 14 rewards community corrections agencies for reductions in recidivism
beyond a set target. See S.B. 14, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2007); CONSERVATIVE PARTY, POLICY GREEN
PAPER NO. 4, PRISONS WITH A PURPOSE: OUR SENTENCING AND REHABILITATION REVOLUTION TO BREAK THE
CYCLE OF CRIME 74 (2008); Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 90 (listing Washington’s performance-based
evaluation of treatment programs; Arizona’s Senate Bill 1476, which provides for performance-based
compensation of probation departments; and other programs in California, Colorado, Illinois, and South
Carolina).
205 DICKER, supra note 123, at 6.
206 See CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 204, at 49, 72–75.
207 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BREAKING THE CYCLE: EFFECTIVE PUNISHMENT, REHABILITATION AND
SENTENCING OF OFFENDERS, 2010, Cm. 7972, at 38–39 (U.K.).
208 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 13.
209 See Wesley Johnson, Payment-by-Results Project Bid to Cut Reoffending, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 11,
2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/paymentbyresults-project-bid-to-cut-reoffending-2368793.html;
John Biggin, Innovative Rehabilitation—Payment by Results at Doncaster Prison, GOV.UK (Oct. 13, 2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/innovative-rehabilitation-payment-by-results-at-doncaster-prison.
210 Joe Inwood, State-Run Leeds Prison to Be Paid on Results, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-15479570. Leeds Prison is also called Armley. Id.
211 Id.
212 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 13, 30 n.29.
213 Id. at 13. At Doncaster, payments start when the reduction is 5%. Biggin, supra note 209.
214 DICKER, supra note 123, at 13.
215 There’s also a twenty-four-hour help line. Johnson, supra note 209; Biggin, supra note 209.
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limited to the welfare to work market[,] where success [was] varied and
limited.”)216
A parallel program focused on finding jobs for offenders, called Job Deal,
compensates providers based on employment rates.217 Compensation is 70%
fixed and 30% conditional—a third of the conditional payment is for an output
measure, “successfully enrolling offenders” in the program; another third is for
“a combination of outputs and processes” such as “helping clients open bank
accounts”; and another third is “for achieving ‘hard outcomes.’”218 Note,
though, that even these “hard outcomes” are softer than they might seem,
because they include finding a job but also include “enrolling in further
learning.”219 Some additional payment-by-results programs have also been
proposed by the government or by the Social Market Foundation, focusing
either on reoffending rates or on other outcomes or outputs like “drug use
cessation or employment.”220
2. The Range of Possible Contracts
a. General Considerations
These examples suggest how performance-based contracts could be
structured. The contract could provide that the contract price is not just the
usual flat per-diem per prisoner,221 but an incentive payment that—as a simple
example—could vary (positively) with how many inmates find jobs or
(negatively) with how many inmates are rearrested within two years.222

216 CHRIS NICHOLSON, REHABILITATION WORKS: ENSURING PAYMENT BY RESULTS CUTS REOFFENDING 5
(2011); see also id. at 21–24 (discussing the experience with payment-by-results in the welfare to work
context, characterizing the “Pathways to Work” program as unsuccessful and the “Employment Zones”
program as reasonably successful).
217 DICKER, supra note 123, at 13.
218 Id. at 14.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Dolovich, supra note 5, at 474; see also Tennessee CCA 2007 contract, supra note 67, § C.3 (laying
out schedule of per diems).
222 See Kenneth L. Avio, On Private Prisons: An Economic Analysis of the Model Contract and Model
Statute for Private Incarceration, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 265, 294–95 (1991); Daniel
L. Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 46 (2003); Kyle, supra note 162, at 2111–12; Gaes, supra note 36, at 23 (citing GAES ET
AL., supra note 7).
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Outcome measurements may not always be available for all dimensions of
quality, so some measurement of inputs may continue to be necessary.223 But
as far as possible, the ideal should be to make compensation contingent not on
inputs like guard training, or even on outputs like the number of GEDs granted
or the number of rehabilitative programs offered or ACA accreditation,224 but
primarily on actual outcomes like the extent of unconstitutional conditions or
how well prisoners are actually rehabilitated or how many prisoners get
jobs.225
The amount of the bonus can be a flat fee, or it could be more
complicated—in the case of recidivism bonuses, the bonus could be inmatespecific, depending on “the probability and social cost of recidivism for each
inmate”—or it could even be determined by competitive bidding.226 It’s often
charged that private prisons have little incentive to invest in rehabilitation,227
and in fact have an incentive to try to increase recidivism, so that they can get
(at least some of) the same inmates back later; if this is so, the bonuses should
be at least high enough to counteract this incentive so rehabilitating inmates is
affirmatively attractive to prison firms.228
Though I focus here on monetary rewards and penalties, there are other
possibilities. High performance could, instead of increasing a firm’s
compensation in the individual contract, merely confer a reputational benefit,

223 Durham suggests that “process-oriented monitoring methods” continue to be used: “[A] system of
frequent accounting of staffing levels can detect shortfalls in staffing that may lead to a diminution in service
provision. . . . If the change in staffing levels is detected relatively quickly, efforts can be made to either
restore institutional staff to initial levels or to alter the evaluation design.” Durham, supra note 20, at 66; see
also DICKER, supra note 123, at 16 (suggesting intermediate outcomes such as drug misuse, stability of
relationships, or becoming debt-free); Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and
Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1775, 1779 (2008); cf. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/TGGD-97-151, PERFORMANCE-BASED ORGANIZATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE BRITISH NEXT STEPS INITIATIVE 7
(1997) (discussing why measuring inputs may be necessary in the context of British Next Steps agencies);
Shapiro & Steinzor, supra, at 1779 (discussing why measuring inputs may be necessary in the context of the
EPA and GPRA).
224 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 49 (“Correctional administrators . . . reported that 57 of the
contracts in force at the end of 1997 required that facilities achieve ACA accreditation within a specified
time.”).
225 See Kyle, supra note 162, at 2112–13.
226 Low, supra note 222, at 46; see also infra Part III.C.3.
227 The same charge can also be leveled against the public sector, where incentives generally aren’t
strong. Currently, private prisons do invest in rehabilitative inputs as required by their contracts—something
that isn’t always required in the public sector.
228 See Avio, supra note 168, at 150; Pozen, supra note 79, at 283–84; James Theodore Gentry, Note, The
Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353, 362–63 (1986).

VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

1/21/2014 4:05 PM

PRISON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

377

increasing its probability of winning future bids.229 One could give out
certificates230 or “even simply publiciz[e] league tables of recidivism
performance.”231 Or one could reward good performers by giving them more
flexibility in future contracts.232
b. Rewards or Penalties
Going back to monetary incentives, one can choose between penalties for
bad performance and rewards for good performance233—or one could have
both—though the difference needn’t be that important.
Consider a “rewards” contract that offers a $1 per diem reward for each
unit of quality on a hypothetical 0-to-10 scale, so the potential reward is $0 to
$10. Suppose Acme Corrections Corp. expects to achieve a quality level of 5 at
a total cost of $35 per diem.234 Then it would be willing to submit a bid of $30
or above for the project; it would just cover its costs with the $30 payment plus
the $5 reward. (Recall that prison bids are bids on how much money the
contractor will get from the government; a $30 per diem winning bid means
that the contractor will be paid $30 per inmate-day.) Suppose bidding is
competitive, other firms have similar technology, and Acme is the most
efficient firm; then Acme wins the auction with its $30 bid.235 (A less efficient
firm, say one that would require $36 per diem to achieve quality level 5,
wouldn’t bid below $31, so Acme, as a more efficient firm, would be
automatically rewarded up front for its higher quality by having a better chance
of winning the auction.236 The bids don’t tell us the true social cost, the true
cost to the government, or the true quality—that requires waiting for the actual
realized level of quality, which determines the level of the reward—but they do
signal which firm is (or believes that it is) more efficient.237)

229 See CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 204, at 73–74 (describing Avon Park Youth Academy in
Florida as “a prison rewarded by results,” even though its only reward was having its contract renewed, “a
decision clearly influenced” by its lower recidivism results); DICKER, supra note 123, at 25.
230 Burt S. Barnow, The Effects of Performance Standards on State and Local Programs, in EVALUATING
WELFARE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS 277, 286 (Charles F. Manski & Irwin Garfinkel eds., 1992).
231 Pozen, supra note 79, at 283; accord Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 86.
232 See Barnow, supra note 230, at 286.
233 See Thomas, supra note 138, at 108–09.
234 This is taking into account the incentive effects of the $1-per-unit reward. Perhaps earlier, with fixedprice contracts, Acme only achieved, say, a quality level of 3 at a total cost of $32.
235 I discuss auction-theoretic considerations like the winner’s curse at infra text accompanying note 256.
236 See Gentry, supra note 228, at 363.
237 See also infra text accompanying notes 256–57.
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Now consider an alternative “penalties” contract that offers a $1 penalty for
each unit of quality below 10 (i.e., 7 units of quality lead to a $3 penalty). This
contract has equivalent incentive effects to the previous one: a provider will
invest in a unit of quality as long as its cost of doing so is under $1.238
Therefore, these incentives, as before, make Acme expect to achieve the same
quality level of 5, which we have seen carries a total cost of $35 per diem.
Now Acme is willing to submit a bid of $40 or above for the project; it would
just cover its cost with the $40 payment minus the $5 penalty. Again, with the
competitive bidding assumptions listed above, Acme wins the auction with its
$40 bid.
So even though the contracts look different, they have essentially identical
incentives, and any superficial differences between them are, roughly
speaking, ironed out in the bidding process. The provider’s degree of risk
aversion doesn’t change the result. The government can offer contracts with
penalties, but then it will pay more to the winning bidder; or it can offer
contracts with rewards, and the winning bidder will be satisfied with less. (One
difference might be in the timing of the payments: if the base price is paid up
front while rewards or penalties are processed some time later, the first
contract is somewhat less valuable than the second because its payments are
more delayed.)239
c. Controlling for Baselines
In the same way, it probably doesn’t make a huge difference whether the
compensation takes into account the baseline level of quality.
Controlling for baselines is a huge issue in the literature on performance
measures.240 For instance, an early paper on performance measures, by Gloria
238 Here, I’m abstracting away from behavioral factors that might make rewards more attractive than
punishments. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 5 (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra at 30–31; see also Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 85 (“[U]nless a manager is truly
oppositional and incompetent, we would not favor the use of negative sanctions—sticks—to coerce
compliance with efforts to reduce recidivism. In the long run, such meanness would risk creating collective
defiance and a failed reform.”).
239 See infra text accompanying note 392.
240 See, e.g., DICKER, supra note 123, at 20 & fig.2 (discussing use of “performance of control groups” or
a whole range of control methods); GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 159 (citing Carolyn J. Heinrich, OutcomesBased Performance Management in the Public Sector: Implications for Government Accountability and
Effectiveness, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 712 (2002) (questioning, as characterized by Gaes, “whether outcome
measures in the absence of a control or comparison group can provide meaningful information” in the context
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Grizzle and coauthors, discussed methodological issues regarding what makes
for a good performance measure.241 A large part of the discussion focused on
doing the proper econometric modeling to figure out the causal factors behind
a performance measure.242 Figuring out these causal factors is important for at
least two reasons (beyond merely understanding the process). One is to have a
sense of what input or output measures to use if the outcome measures aren’t
available in a given case.243 Another is to be able to properly assign credit, so
providers who get a bad (or good) population of inmates aren’t blamed (or
praised) for bad (or good) results.244
Similarly, Gerald Gaes and his coauthors argue that “social scientists
should push ultimate outcomes as far as they can be pushed,”245 but that, in
light of the other factors that affect recidivism, “[i]t is also desirable to have
more direct measures of intermediate changes to human behavior that precede
desistance, and that may be influenced by criminal justice interventions.”246
They don’t directly list desirable performance measures—they give an
example of performance measures for the specific element of “Prison Security
Performance,”247 though they stress that one should do a similar exercise for
other elements of prison performance such as health care.248 The main
characteristic of their approach is its emphasis on adequately modeling prison
performance in terms of individual-level and institutional-level independent
variables so that one can properly attribute credit where credit is due, avoid
blaming prisons for factors beyond their control like the characteristics of the
inmates, and figure out what inputs are actually important in producing prison
performance.249 For instance, for health care, rather than measure (or in
addition to measuring) the prevalence of a disease in the prison, which
indicates the potential for transmission, it would be useful to use the number of
of the Job Training Partnership Act)); Barnow, supra note 230, at 281 (“[P]erformance management systems
[could] measure outcomes relative to [a] standard. . . . [that is] set to take into account what would have
occurred in the absence of the program . . . .”); Kyle, supra note 162, at 2112 (controlling for “age, prior
criminal history, and sex”); id. at 2113 & n.136 (controlling for crime rates).
241 GLORIA A. GRIZZLE ET AL., BASIC ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE 4 (1982).
242 See id. at 91.
243 See infra Part II.D.
244 See GRIZZLE ET AL., supra note 241, at 91.
245 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 7.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 142 tbl.10.1.
248 See id. at 141.
249 See id. at 144 (discussing differences with Logan model); see also id. at 4 (suggesting “develop[ing] an
expected rate of crime for a community or an expected rate of misconduct for a prison based on characteristics
of the people and inmates”).
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cases in the incoming population as a baseline, and measure the number of new
cases.250
Is all this necessary? Let’s do our numerical example again: Consider the
rewards contract discussed above, with a $1 per diem reward for every unit of
quality on a 0-to-10 scale;251 the winning bidder, who expected to deliver
quality level 5 at a cost of $35, would have won the contract with a bid of $30.
Now consider a rewards contract that controls for the baseline level of quality;
suppose the expected level of quality for this prison is 4, so a quality level of 5
would yield a reward of $1.
The only effect of the quality adjustment is to reduce reward payments by
$4. A bidder who was willing to bid $30 on the unadjusted contract would be
willing to bid $34 on the adjusted contract, to take into account the $4
reduction in the expected reward. Either way, the payoff is the same to the
contractor—and the price is the same to the government. The government
saves $4 on reward payments but pays it all out again in the base contract price
that emerges from the auction. Jeremy Bentham argued against controlling for
baselines two centuries ago:
I would make [the contractor] pay so much for every one that died,
without troubling myself whether any care of his could have kept the
man alive. To be sure he would make me pay for this in the contract;
but as I should receive it from him afterwards, what it cost me in the
long run would be no great matter. . . .
. . . [Under this system,] you need not doubt of his fondness of
these his adopted children; of whom whosoever may chance while
under his wing to depart this vale of tears, will be sure to leave one
252
sincere mourner at least . . . .

To be sure, the bidder has to have a way to figure out that the expected
level of quality is 4. This requires two things. First, the bidder should have a
belief about the proper model to predict the baseline quality level; different
bidders can have competing beliefs about reality that lead them to different
predictions. Second, it needs to have enough information about the population
of inmates to plug into its model. Where either of these is absent, the
contractor won’t know how much to bid—this might lead to excessive

250

See id. at 38.
See supra text accompanying notes 234–35
252 Gentry, supra note 228, at 362 n.52 (alterations in original) (quoting 1 JEREMY BENTHAM,
PANOPTICON 71–73 (Dublin 1791)).
251
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payments from the taxpayer’s point of view or insufficient payments from the
contractor’s point of view—but the incentive effects will remain the same.
So while adjusting for the baseline is relevant for various reasons—it
allows one to more accurately assign praise or blame, rank different
facilities,253 and so on—it doesn’t seem absolutely necessary for a
compensation scheme to provide the proper incentives for improvement.
Moreover, risk aversion makes a difference here,254 but not in the way one
would expect. Controlling for baselines might even increase risk, depending
on the uncertainty in the calculation of the baseline.255
If the contractor gets too little, there is the concern that it might not be able
to fund the project and might go bankrupt within the contractual term. But this
is the same concern that happens with all bidding. Whether or not we adjust the
payment for the baseline, the winning bid under a low-bid system will be
subject to the “winner’s curse.”256 As a simple example, consider many firms
with identical technology. They each have slightly different models for
predicting how profitable a prison will be, and firms with higher predictions
will submit lower bids. At most one of these models is correct; everyone else’s
model is incorrect to some degree. The lowest bid will thus come from the
bidder who makes the most wildly incorrect overestimate of his profits.
Sophisticated bidders adjust their bids to take the winner’s curse into account,
but the winning bidder might either be unsophisticated or end up not having
adjusted his bid enough. So the threat of contractors who go bankrupt—or of

253

See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 144 (discussing concern with rank-ordering institutions).
Recall that it didn’t in the reasoning establishing the equivalence of reward and penalty contracts. See
supra Part II.C.2.b.
255 Without controlling for baselines, the winning contractor gets a contract price of P and a performancebased reward R, bears costs of C, and his payoff is P + R – C; the variance of the payoff is var(R) + var(C) if
R and C are independent. Now let’s control for baselines; for simplicity, assume this just involves subtracting
an adjustment A from the reward, where A is determined by the expected baseline level of performance. The
contract price becomes P', and the contractor’s new payoff is P' + R – A – C. If A has no randomness—
everyone knows the government’s formula and everyone knows the underlying data that the government is
plugging into the formula—then var(A) = 0 and the variance of the new payoff is the same var(R) + var(C).
But if the data or the formula is somewhat uncertain, var(A) is positive, so the variance of the new payoff is
var(R) + var(A) + var(C) if R, A, and C are independent, which is greater.
This doesn’t necessarily have to happen. Suppose, for instance, that R, A, and C aren’t independent,
but instead there’s some negative covariance among R, A, and C. Then the randomness of A might cancel out
some of the randomness of R and C, and the adjustment can indeed reduce risk. The point in the text, though,
is that this needn’t be the case, and the adjustment, though often defended as a risk-reducing move for
contractors, could end up doing the opposite.
256 See, e.g., PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 283–85 (2005).
254
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contractors who bid low and then try and hold the government up for more
money257—is real. But, again, this happens regardless of whether we adjust for
baselines. The solution is instead to require performance bonds, to rely on a
track record of past performance (and restrict complete newcomers to small
projects until they’ve proven themselves), or otherwise to try to weed out
financially unsophisticated or untrustworthy parties.
d. Discrete vs. Continuous Measures
Note that, in the preceding example, the contract price varied continuously
with the level of quality.258 Another possibility would have been to use a
binary compensation scheme, where the reward or penalty is contingent on
whether one reaches a particular target. This could look like “Get a fixed
reward only if you achieve less than 50% recidivism.”259
These binary schemes, while easier to implement, are problematic in
several ways. Providers who don’t expect to be able to reach anywhere near
the target have little incentive to try to achieve anything at all.260 Providers
who do expect to be able to reach the target quite comfortably have little
incentive to try to achieve anything additional.261 Providers who may or may
not be able to reach the target are subjected to more risk than they would bear
under a continuous scheme.262 Perhaps a large corporation might act somewhat
257

See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574 (2000);
Robert W. Poole, Jr., Privatization, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008), available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Privatization.html; Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the
Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 155 (2010). See generally OLIVER HART, FIRMS,
CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995) (discussing opportunistic behavior in contract relationships).
258 Well, the example as worded involved discrete jumps, but one can easily imagine the prorated version.
The “continuous” scheme is also called a “distance travelled” scheme. DICKER, supra note 123, at 16 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see infra text accompanying notes 422–25, 436.
259 See HARDING, supra note 72, at 68 (“x per cent of participants [in a remedial literacy class] reaching
attainment level y in z months.”).
260 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 19 (explaining that a continuous measure “may incentivise providers to
engage with high-risk offenders who are unlikely to achieve absolute desistance”); HARDING, supra note 72, at
68.
261 On the other hand, incentives are very large for those who could be just under the cutoff but could also
reach the cutoff; but even then, unless the cutoff is a magical point, it’s probably more socially optimal to
provide continuous incentives.
262 Kyle also notes the following advantage of a sliding scale: it “would reduce the likelihood that private
companies would receive an undeserved windfall—the farther in standard deviations from the mean the private
prison is, the more likely a causal relationship that should be rewarded exists.” Kyle, supra note 162, at 2112.
More accurately, this depends on the likely effect of rehabilitative measures versus the likely magnitude of
unobserved factors: it could be that a truly exceptional performance in fact reflects an unusually (and
unobservedly) good or rehabilitable crop of inmates.
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risk-neutrally, so risk won’t matter; but smaller firms or nonprofits may refrain
from bidding, or may require more money to take the project, or may be
reluctant to try high-expected-value but risky strategies.263
(Of course, one could also imagine intermediate reward schemes: for
example, the reward could be almost flat for any level of recidivism above
50% and increase rapidly at or below 50%, for instance, “Get a reward of
$0.01 for every percentage-point reduction of recidivism below 100% and
down to 50%, and then a reward of $1.00 for every percentage-point reduction
beyond 50%.”264 British performance contracts, where payments don’t start
until the decrease in recidivism is 5% or 7.5%, and where payments are capped
once the decrease is high enough, fit this mold.265 At this point I won’t do
anything more than signal the existence of such contracts, though the optimal
slope of the compensation scheme is something I’ll return to below when I
discuss risk allocation.266)
The same is true of penalties that may occur during the contractual term.
Governments can terminate their contracts267—this is a form of binary
scheme—though this is a rare remedy that tends to be reserved for the most
extreme abuses.268 Providing for graduated financial penalties for abuses of
different severity is probably a better solution than merely providing for
contract rescission, because draconian penalties are less likely to be used. Not
that termination isn’t appropriate in extreme cases—governments should
always retain the ability to take over a prison if a contract is terminated.269 The
need to retain a credible threat of termination is one reason to prefer that

263 See infra Part III.B.2. Some also mention the possibility that the public could see the continuous
measure as being “too lenient.” See, e.g., DICKER, supra note 123, at 20.
264 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 24 (“[C]reate a minimum threshold of achievement that providers must
attain before payments commence.”); id. at 25 (discussing a “target accelerator,” where increases are rewarded
at an increasing rate).
265 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
266 See infra Part III.B.2.
267 See Tennessee CCA 2007 contract, supra note 67, § D.3 (“The State may terminate this Contract
without cause for any reason.”); id. § D.4 (“If the Contractor fails to properly perform its obligations under this
Contract in a timely or proper manner, or if the Contractor violates any terms of this Contract, the State shall
have the right to immediately terminate the Contract and withhold payments in excess of fair compensation for
completed services.”).
268 See Dolovich, supra note 5, at 495–500; Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 9,
at 1883–84.
269 See supra text accompanying note 181.
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governments, not prison firms, own the prisons, since government ownership
of the physical facility reduces termination costs.270
3. The Feasibility of Merit Pay in the Public Sector
Note, also, that while I’ve been primarily concentrating on incentives for
private firms, there’s no inherent reason why performance-based compensation
can’t also be considered for public prison wardens271—consider the example of
Leeds noted above272—especially if we simultaneously pursue competitive
neutrality.273 As John Donahue says, “the fundamental distinction is between
competitive output-based relationships and noncompetitive input-based
relationships rather than between profit-seekers and civil servants per se.”274
Proposals to reward public servants for high performance aren’t rare,275 and
merit-based compensation in the public sector has increased in recent years,276
but it’s still hard to find in corrections.277
Researchers differ on how feasible merit pay is in the public sector;278 I
won’t resolve the argument here, except to note that the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 has a procedure by which agencies can
make “proposals to waive administrative procedural requirements and controls,
including specification of personnel staffing levels, limitations on
compensation or remuneration, and prohibitions or restrictions on funding
transfers . . . in return for specific individual or organization accountability to
270 See Levinson, supra note 24, at 90 (discussing the “possibility of [a] contractor’s bankruptcy which
would require rapid, costly interim arrangements”).
271 See Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 84; Rick Hills, Merit Pay for Prison Wardens?, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Mar. 3, 2008), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/03/tying-the-salar.html.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 210.
273 See supra text accompanying notes 183–97.
274 JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 82 (1989) (italics
omitted).
275 See NISKANEN, supra note 185, at 201–09; Barnow, supra note 230, at 307–08; Lynn, supra note 165,
at 11; cf. David N. Figlio & Lawrence W. Kenny, Individual Teacher Incentives and Student Performance, 91
J. PUB. ECON. 901, 903 (2007) (examining effects of teacher merit pay).
276 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1048 & nn.124–25, 1049 (2013).
277 See Thomas, supra note 138, at 109.
278 Compare Harding, supra note 145, at 304 (“The financial incentive should drive performance in a way
that is impossible in the state-funded public sector.”), and McDonald & Patten, supra note 155, at xxvii
(“When structuring contracts, [governments] also have opportunities to create incentives and mechanisms for
accountability that are more difficult to implement in existing public organizations.”), with GAES ET AL., supra
note 7, at 151 (“There is certainly no reason why public administrators cannot award bonuses to the best
performing public prison managers and their employees, while also demoting, firing, or transferring the
managers who are substandard.”), and id. at 180 (“Contrary to the point of view of some scholars, we do not
see how a contract offers an advantage over public provision.”).
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achieve a performance goal.”279 Any such proposal, according to the statute,
must “describe the anticipated effects on performance resulting from greater
managerial or organizational flexibility, discretion, and authority,
and . . . quantify the expected improvements in performance resulting from any
waiver,”280 “precisely express the monetary change in compensation or
remuneration amounts, such as bonuses or awards, that shall result from
meeting, exceeding, or failing to meet performance goals,”281 and be “endorsed
by the agency that established the requirement.”282 Just reading the statutory
language—and this is a statute that purports to encourage flexibility—doesn’t
exactly give one confidence that public-sector flexibility is easy to come by, at
least in the federal system.
At the very least, though, to the extent performance-based compensation is
a good idea in the private sector, it may well also be a good idea in the public
sector.283 How feasible that is is a question of the relevant state or federal law.
D. What Measures to Choose
The earlier discussion of how to define recidivism284 shows that a lot rides
on choosing the outcome measures judiciously. This applies across the board,
not just to recidivism. This section considers two distinct aspects of
performance measures. The first is that wherever outcome measures have been
used, output measures haven’t been abandoned. The second is that what
outcomes to measure—and even whether something counts as an output or
outcome measure—is inevitably a value-laden question, which must be
resolved for a performance-based compensation scheme to go forward. The
inevitable incompleteness of outcome measures—and therefore the need to
supplement outcomes with outputs—can give rise to undesirable strategic
behavior, which I discuss in a later section.285

279

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 § 5(a), 31 U.S.C. § 9703(a) (2006).
Id. § 9703(b).
281 Id. § 9703(c).
282 Id. § 9703(d).
283 Some of the disadvantages of performance-based compensation may apply with different force in the
public than in the private sector. For instance, the concern that market incentives will discourage publicinterested people from entering the industry, see infra Part III.B.1, seems to not apply at all to private
providers, who are presumably already profit motivated.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 120–26.
285 See infra Part III.C.2. This section only covers what measures should rationally be chosen, not the realworld possibilities for manipulation in the choice of goals. That sort of strategic behavior is covered infra Part
III.C.1.
280
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Adopting specific outcomes to measure is equivalent to adopting what John
DiIulio calls an “operational” goal—“an image of a desired future state of
affairs that can be compared unambiguously to an actual or existing state of
affairs.”286 “‘Improving the quality of public education in America’ is a
nonoperational goal; ‘Increasing the average verbal and math SAT scores of
public school students by 20% between the year 1992 and the year 2000’ is an
operational goal.”287 Similarly, “[r]eforming criminals” is nonoperational,
while “[d]oubling the rate of inmate participation in prison industry programs”
is operational.288 That last goal was output-based, but there’s no reason we
can’t, as in the education example, adopt an outcome-based goal—we could
just agree on a convenient if arbitrary measure of how well criminals are
reformed, such as the two-year reconviction rate.289 Moreover, there’s no
reason to adopt a numerical target as the goal (which would be binary); the
goal might merely be (thinking more continuously) to reduce the rate as far as
possible.290 And there’s no reason to adopt a unique goal: multiple operational
goals can be implemented in one part of an overall index that determines
compensation.291
A useful way to explore this question is to examine some existing prison
performance measures. Perhaps one of the oldest formal approaches292 to
measuring prison performance is the Correctional Institutions Environment
Scale293 developed by Rudolph Moos in the late 1960s294 and often used in the
286

John J. DiIulio, Jr., Measuring Performance When There Is No Bottom Line, in PERFORMANCE
MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 142, 144 (1993).
287 Id.
288 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
289 See, e.g., Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 87 (“[T]he objectives should be stated in a concrete,
unambiguous way: ‘The XYZ prison will reduce recidivism of released high-risk offenders so that no more
than 20% are arrested within 1 year.’”).
290 See supra text accompanying notes 258–63.
291 Of course, one should also set the weights to be put on the various measures in the index. See infra
Part III.A; cf. GRIZZLE ET AL., supra note 241, at 80; Barnow, supra note 230, at 284 (“Even if the program has
a single objective, it may be advantageous to use several measures as proxies if an ideal measure cannot be
developed.”). Realistically, the number of measures shouldn’t be too large, lest it overwhelm decision-makers’
cognitive capacities. One can’t think about all things simultaneously.
292 A survey article in 1975 reviewed 231 studies of particular performance measures, but at that time, in
the authors’ opinions, there had apparently never been any comprehensive approach. (Presumably the Moos
approach, if it was considered, was thought to be insufficiently comprehensive or not performance oriented.)
The American Correctional Association had published comprehensive standards in the late 1970s, but they
were primarily process oriented. See GRIZZLE ET AL., supra note 241, at 4 (citing DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL.,
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975);
AM. CORR. ASS’N, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1977)).
293 Michael Montgomery, Performance Measures and Private Prisons, in 3 PRISON PRIVATIZATION, supra
note 142, at 187, 193.
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1970s.295 The Moos scale contains several subscales: “Involvement,”
“Support,” “Expressiveness,” “Autonomy,” “Practical Orientation,” “Personal
Problem Orientation,” “Order and Organization,” “Clarity,” and “Staff
Control.”296 These elements generally aren’t true performance measures, and
it’s immediately apparent from their definitions that some are highly
impressionistic. The “Involvement” variable “[m]easures how active and
energetic residents are”; the “Support” variable “[m]easures the extent to
which residents are encouraged to be helpful and supportive”; and so on, with
an emphasis on measuring the extent of supportiveness and encouragement.297
The scale was criticized because it wasn’t clear what the difference between
some of the elements was and to what extent they were correlated,298 and even
to what extent they described a real phenomenon.299 Some critics wrote that
“when the CIES is administered and the individual scores are tallied and
averaged, we really have no idea what the scores on the nine subscales
indicate.”300 Ultimately, the scale was “determined not to possess acceptable
validity.”301
A later approach, described in 1980 in a report by Martha Burt, uses five
types of measures: “Measures of Security,” including the escape rate and
escape seriousness; “Measures of Living and Safety Conditions,” such as
victimization, overcrowding, and sanitation; “Measures of Inmate Health”
(both physical and mental); “Intermediate Products of Programs and Services”
like improvements in basic skills and vocational education completed; and
“Measures of Post-Release Success,” including employment success and
recidivism.302 Only the fourth category is explicitly labeled “Intermediate
Products,”303 but some of the other measures are also outputs, not outcomes—

294

Kevin N. Wright & James Boudouris, An Assessment of the Moos Correctional Institutions
Environment Scale, 19 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 255, 255 (1982).
295 See id. (citing sources using the Moos scale in the 1970s).
296 Id. at 257 (quoting RUDOLF H. MOOS, EVALUATING CORRECTIONAL AND COMMUNITY SETTINGS 41
(1975)).
297 Id.
298 Id. at 256; Elaine Selo, Book Review, 4 J. CRIM. JUST. 348, 349 (1976) (reviewing MOOS, supra note
296).
299 Wright & Boudouris, supra note 294, at 258.
300 Id. at 274.
301 Montgomery, supra note 293, at 193.
302 MARTHA R. BURT, URBAN INST., MEASURING PRISON RESULTS: WAYS TO MONITOR AND EVALUATE
CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE, at ii (1980).
303 Id. at 97–105.
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see, for instance, the use of hospitalizations and sick days in the measures of
inmate health.304
The mixing of output and outcome measures is fairly typical; John DiIulio
criticizes the BOP’s Key Indicators/Strategic Support System305 for also
“indiscriminate[ly] mixing . . . process [i.e., input or output] and performance
[i.e., outcome] measures.”306 But DiIulio himself has measured prison quality
in terms of “order (rates of individual and collective violence and other forms
of misconduct), amenity (availability of clean cells, decent food, etc.), and
service (availability of work opportunities, educational programs, etc.)”307:
note the output measures in the inclusion of the availability (not the
effectiveness) of programming.
The MTC Institute, the research arm of the private prison firm Management
& Training Corp. (MTC), likewise calls for holding prisons accountable for
“outcomes”; but these “outcomes” include not only assaults, escapes,
recidivism, overcrowding, and the like, but also outputs like “[s]ubstance abuse
education/treatment completions” and “[p]roportion of inmates participating in
spiritual development program(s).”308
The American Correctional Association’s performance-based standards for
correctional health care309 raise the same issue. Some of these are true
outcomes, like “the rate of positive tuberculin skin tests”310 or the suicide
rate,311 though others are process measures or expected practices, like whether
an offender “is informed about access to health systems and the grievance
procedure.”312 The Prison Social Climate Survey, which is based on inmate
and staff surveys, likewise mixes outcomes (such as crowding313 or safety314)
304

Id. at 72.
See generally WILLIAM G. SAYLOR, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC SUPPORT
SYSTEM: MONITORING THE BUREAU’S PERFORMANCE VIA TRENDS IN KEY INDICATORS (1988).
306 DiIulio, supra note 286, at 150–52.
307 John J. DiIulio, Jr., Recovering the Public Management Variable: Lessons from Schools, Prisons, and
Armies, 49 PUB. ADM. REV. 127, 129 (1989) (citing JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT (1987)).
308 MTC INST., MEASURING SUCCESS: IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 5
(2006).
309 AM. CORR. ASS’N, PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARDS FOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE IN ADULT
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2002). These standards are discussed in GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 37–38.
310 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 37.
311 Id. at 38.
312 Id. at 37.
313 Michael W. Ross et al., Measurement of Prison Social Climate: A Comparison of an Inmate Measure
in England and the USA, 10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 447, 460–61 tbl.3 (2008).
305

VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

1/21/2014 4:05 PM

PRISON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

389

with outputs (such as whether the prison is a pleasant place to work for
staff315).
It is clear, then, that outcomes and output measures tend to go together; no
doubt this is because not all outcomes are well measurable. Moreover, the
choice of measures, and even the basic question of whether to classify a
measure as an output or an outcome, is inevitably value-laden. We can see this
clearly by examining Charles Logan’s “quality of confinement” index, one of
the more highly regarded prison performance measures.316 Logan’s
performance indicators focus on eight broad categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

“Security (‘keep them in’).”
“Safety (‘keep them safe’).”
“Order (‘keep them in line’).”
“Care (‘keep them healthy’).”
“Activity (‘keep them busy’).”
“Justice (‘do it with fairness’).”
“Conditions (‘without undue suffering’).”
“Management (‘as efficiently as possible’).”317

Each of these categories contains a number of subdimensions: for instance,
the “security” category contains the subdimensions of security procedures,
drug use, significant incidents, community exposure, freedom of movement,
and staffing adequacy.318 The “safety” category contains safety of inmates,
safety of staff, dangerousness of inmates, safety of environment, and (again)
staffing adequacy.319

314

Id. at 463, 466–67 tbl.5.
See WILLIAM G. SAYLOR ET AL., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PRISON SOCIAL CLIMATE SURVEY:
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY ANALYSES OF THE WORK ENVIRONMENT CONSTRUCTS 3–8 (1996); see also supra
text accompanying note 87.
316 Charles H. Logan, Criminal Justice Performance Measures for Prisons, in PERFORMANCE MEASURES
FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 286, at 19; see GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at xi (calling
Logan’s approach “one serious attempt to develop a coherent theoretical and empirical approach to prison
performance measurement”); id. at 5–8 (discussing Logan’s model). Joan Petersilia has also developed
performance measures for community corrections. See Joan Petersilia, Measuring the Performance of
Community Corrections, in PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 286, at
60, 77–78. But many of these are input measures (“Number and type of supervision contacts”), output
measures (“Number of hours/days performed community service”), or outcome measures that can be easily
gamed (“Number of arrests and technical violation[s] during supervision”). Id. at 77–78.
317 Logan, supra note 316, at 27–32.
318 Id. at 34.
319 Id.
315
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And, finally, Logan decomposes these subdimensions into specific
numerical measures: number of escapes, proportion of staff who have observed
staff ignoring inmate misconduct, ratio of resident population to security staff,
drug-related incidents, and so on.320 In all—over all eight dimensions—there
are a few hundred measures.321 Logan used this index to evaluate three
women’s prisons in New Mexico and West Virginia.322
None of Logan’s measures involve how many inmates get rehabilitated.
But this is also intentional. First, actual rehabilitation is out of the direct
control of prisons. Logan has a preference for measuring things that are within
prisons’ “direct sphere of influence”;323 what we measure “ought to be
achievable and measurable mostly within the prison itself.”324 Second,
including rehabilitation endorses the rehabilitative model of criminal
punishment, and Logan makes it clear that his model is retributive, not
rehabilitative.325 Prisons, in his view, shouldn’t “add to (any more
than . . . avoid or . . . compensate for) the pain and suffering inherent in being
forcibly separated from civil society[;] . . . coercive confinement carries with it
an obligation to meet the basic needs of prisoners at a reasonable standard of
decency.”326
Logan’s concern for focusing on what a prison can control and focusing on
the retributive goal merge in the following statement: “a prison does not have
to justify itself as a tool of rehabilitation or crime control or any other
instrumental purpose at which an army of critics will forever claim it to be a
failure.”327 (Of course “[i]t would be very nice if the prison programs [counted
in the ‘activity’ dimension] had rehabilitative effects,” and perhaps they do, but
whether they do or don’t doesn’t enter into the index.)328
Fair enough. What this illustrates is that you can’t judge particular
measures to be desirable unless you have a normative theory that proclaims
certain goals to be desirable, and such a political discussion is necessary before

320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328

Id. at 42–43.
See id. at 42–57.
See LOGAN, supra note 61, at 7–11, 13, 17; Logan, supra note 61, at 577–78, 583 fig.1.
Logan, supra note 316, at 24.
Id.
Id. at 19, 21, 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 29 n.7.
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one can commit oneself to a particular form of performance measures.329
“[W]ithout declared goals, we cannot hold a jurisdiction accountable, and
performance measurement is meaningless.”330
This normative issue arises wherever performance measurements are used.
John DiIulio describes how John Chubb and Terry Moe “measure school
performance strictly in terms of pupils’ achievements on a battery of
standardized tests, accepting the schools’ value as instruments of socialization
and civics training as important but secondary.”331 On the relative value of test
scores vs. socialization, your mileage may vary.
Likewise, for the correctional system, there is a great variety of available
goals;332 prisons should punish, rehabilitate, deter, incapacitate, and
reintegrate—all, says John DiIulio, “without violating the public conscience
(humane treatment), jeopardizing the public law (constitutional rights),
emptying the public purse (cost containment), or weakening the tradition of
State and local public administration (federalism).”333 So we need to have a
political discussion about what the appropriate goals are.
One’s normative theory also affects whether a particular measure is an
output or an outcome; this classification,334 which I’ve been using casually so
far as if it were value-neutral, is in fact anything but. If we didn’t care about
inmates but only cared about the outside world, perhaps only recidivism would
be relevant. The quality of living conditions or inmate literacy would merely
be outputs, which we would care about only to the extent that they affected
recidivism; they wouldn’t need to independently enter the compensation
function as long as we already counted recidivism. But we might
independently care about inmates’ living conditions for many reasons; if we
do, living conditions become an actual outcome of the system.

329 John DiIulio thus seems incorrect when he states that Logan’s work “dispels the worry that any such
measurement scheme is bound to be based exclusively on one or another moral or ideological view of the
‘ends of criminal justice’” and that his measures “encompass and satisfy every major school of thought about
‘what prisons are for.’” DiIulio, supra note 286, at 152.
330 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at xii.
331 DiIulio, supra note 307, at 129, 131 (citing JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS,
AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990)); see also John E. Chubb, Why the Current Wave of School Reform Will
Fail, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1988, at 28.
332 See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 10–16 tbl.1.1; see also supra text accompanying note 291.
333 John J. DiIulio, Jr., Rethinking the Criminal Justice System: Toward a New Paradigm, in
PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 286, at 1, 6 (italics omitted).
334 See supra text accompanying note 17.
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Thus, some of Logan’s dimensions, like “activity,” which I’m inclined to
call an output measure,335 might be an outcome measure given Logan’s
normative perspective. The same goes for variables like prison employees’ job
satisfaction336 (which I consider an output measure because it’s only
instrumentally relevant to prison quality, but which others who care about
labor conditions might treat differently) or whether inmates have difficulty
concentrating337 (which—unlike, say, overcrowding or physical safety338—
many may not consider an appropriate dimension for prison evaluation).
Some of the measures, though, for instance the number of urinalysis tests
conducted based on suspicion, are output measures under any definition, and
these have the problem that it’s ambiguous whether they’re good or bad. Do
we want more or fewer urinalysis tests based on suspicion? More tests could
mean that drug use has gone up; or it could mean that prison authorities are
getting more serious about controlling drug use. Even worse, prison
authorities’ stringency is something prison authorities themselves can control;
this is a serious problem, which I discuss below.339
As a final note, I’ll mention that while it’s vitally important to have good
cost measures that are adequate for comparing public and private prisons, it’s
not necessary to include cost in the private contractor’s compensation. If we
couldn’t measure quality, perhaps there would be a role for rate-of-return
regulation, which might at least limit some of the private sector’s harmful costcutting tendencies.340 But if we’re going to engage in quality measurement, we
might as well enforce quality directly by getting the rewards or penalties
“right”;341 let the private firms worry about their own costs.342

335 See DiIulio, supra note 286, at 152 (distinguishing between certain “process measures” and certain
“performance measures” within Logan’s “security” dimension); see also Gaes, supra note 36, at 23
(“[J]urisdictions that buy prison services are most concerned about internal performance measures such as
order, health, case management, program services, and safety.”).
336 See supra text accompanying note 315.
337 Ross et al., supra note 313, at 464 tbl.4.
338 See supra text accompanying notes 313–14.
339 See infra Part III.C.2.
340 Cf. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 430–36 (4th ed. 2005)
(discussing the theory of traditional rate-of-return regulation, primarily in the context of electric utilities).
341 See infra Part III.A.
342 Cf. Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 223, at 1767 (questioning whether reducing regulatory cost to the
private sector should be a GPRA performance measure for the FDA).
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III. CONCERNS AND CRITIQUES
Despite the advantages discussed in the previous section, the use of
performance measures has its pitfalls.
One concern, so obvious as not to merit its own section heading, is the
issue of administrative costs. Recidivism-based contracts require one to track
released prisoners adequately. Perhaps there would be substantial startup
costs343—though current probation and parole systems already track releases
and monitor employment, recidivism, and other relevant outcomes, so at least
some of these costs are already sunk. Moreover, if performance-based
contracting is beneficial at all, its benefits are probably great enough that these
startup costs are worthwhile.344
This Part focuses on other concerns and critiques. First, there is the concern
that one can’t set the proper prices in a theoretically defensible way. Second,
there’s the concern that performance-based compensation will affect market
structure, either by driving out the public-interested or by driving out the riskaverse. Third, there’s the concern that performance-based compensation will
lead to undesirable strategic behavior, for instance via manipulation of the
choice of performance goals, by distorting effort across various dimensions of
performance, by distorting effort across various types of inmate, and by
encouraging outright falsification.
A. What Prices to Set
The focus on performance measures might seem grating to those who
criticize the turn toward efficiency analysis and comparative effectiveness and
stress moral considerations.345 But one can support performance measures
without endorsing efficiency in any way—in fact, as a better way of achieving
particular moral goals.

343 See Durham, supra note 20, at 66; see also id. at 67 (“‘At none of the sites we examined were attempts
made by government to evaluate rehabilitative success.’” (quoting JUDITH HACKETT ET AL., ISSUES IN
CONTRACTING FOR THE PRIVATE OPERATION OF PRISONS AND JAILS 48 (1987))).
344 Cf. Low, supra note 222, at 64; Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 834
(2012). One might also measure a random sample of inmates, see Low, supra note 222, at 46 n.298, though
this might exacerbate risk issues. See infra Part III.B.2.
345 Sharon Dolovich critiques “comparative efficiency” analysis and stresses moral considerations, see,
e.g., Dolovich, supra note 3; Dolovich, supra note 5, though to my knowledge she hasn’t opined on
performance measures.
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I myself have been critical of a focus on efficiency in the context of
regulatory cost–benefit analysis,346 another example of hard-numbers-based
accountability. To restate the problems of cost–benefit analysis in the prison
context: What’s the social value of having less recidivism? To ask this in an
economic context, we’d have to know either the maximum amount people
would be willing to pay to reduce crime, or the minimum amount people
would accept to acquiesce in an increase in crime. These are in general
different amounts, and the choice between them is value-laden.347 Suppose we
choose one of these numbers to measure; we may find that, when surveyed,
some people—who reject the very notion of paying or being paid for
reductions or increases in crime—give answers of zero or infinity for their
willingness to pay or accept; the number we’re seeking may just not exist for
these people.348 Some people may have true willingness to pay or accept, but
they don’t even know what these numbers are: we only come to know such
numbers because of our experience paying for and consuming goods and
services in the real world, but increases and decreases in crime generally aren’t
traded in markets. So the very act of asking for the number may bring some
number into being, but there’s no reason to suppose it’s accurate.349 Or, people
may know the number, but there’s no incentive for them to truthfully reveal it
in surveys.
Even if we use non-survey-based estimation methods—How much higher
are house prices in lower-crime areas? How much do people pay to avoid
crime?—econometric analysis isn’t good enough to give us the correct
number.350 The political process is also likely to manipulate the numbers.351
Moreover, concerns that are hard to quantify can be systematically slighted.352
In short, “[w]hile cost–benefit analysis may look like rationality, perhaps
it’s merely rationalism.”353 And these are just the problems for people who
accept the utilitarian basis of cost–benefit analysis. The problems for those
346 See Alexander Volokh, Rationality or Rationalism? The Positive and Normative Flaws of Cost–Benefit
Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 79 (2011).
347 See id. at 82–83.
348 See id. at 84.
349 See id. at 85–86.
350 See id. at 86–88.
351 See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost–Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1580 (2002) (explaining that regulated industry has an
incentive to overstate costs).
352 See id. at 1579–80. This gives rise to potentially serious strategic behavior, which I address in infra
Part III.C.2.
353 Volokh, supra note 346, at 88.

VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

1/21/2014 4:05 PM

PRISON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

395

who reject utilitarianism as a moral philosophy are even greater.354 Surely
corrections policy, of all things, should be decided with respect to morality and
human values rather than numbers?
These are real problems with cost–benefit analysis, and they potentially
infect performance-based contracting as well. Setting the incentives in a
performance-based contract means either setting the relative weights of every
component of performance,355 or (equivalently) setting the separate rewards or
penalties for every component of performance.356 Getting the prices “right,” in
an efficiency sense, requires knowing the social value of the different
components of performance;357 if that social value doesn’t exist or can’t be
measured, it’s an impossible task.
I agree and disagree with this critique.
As to the moral objection, even though moral values have an extremely
important place in criminal law and policy, I have no essential problem with
using economic incentives to improve outcomes in the process. I’ve argued
elsewhere that the valid arguments for or against private prisons generally are
essentially empirical;358 measuring performance is an essential part of that
debate, even though the choice of outcomes to measure is a value-laden
enterprise;359 and attaching incentives to those performance measures is
eminently justifiable if the result is a morally more just correctional system.
As to the theoretical incoherence objection, I’m sympathetic. But the
enterprise can still be salvaged if we adopt a humble attitude.360 Rather than
354

See id. at 88–91.
See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
356 These two approaches are identical. Let x be the ith component of performance and p be the reward
i
i
for that component. Then the total performance-based component of compensation is Σpixi. Let P be the sum
of the prices (P = Σpi). Then the performance-based component of compensation can be expressed as
P Σ(pi/P)xi = P Σwixi, where wi = pi/P is the weight placed on the ith component of performance and P is the
price attached to the overall performance index Σwixi.
357 Not that the price necessarily has to be equal to the social value—paying the price requires incurring
the deadweight losses involved in raising tax money, and making incentives so high-powered might make the
contract too risky. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of optimal risk allocation. But at least the optimal
prices (or at least the relative optimal prices of the different components of performance), from an efficiency
perspective, will probably bear some relation to social value.
358 See generally Volokh, supra note 6.
359 See supra text accompanying notes 329–32.
360 Cf. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108 MICH. L. REV.
877, 885 (2010) (reviewing RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW
COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008)) (stating that
Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore “regard regulatory cost-benefit analysis as a device for social
355
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trying to achieve incentives that are correct in some abstract sense,361 we can
just try to muddle through and ameliorate the problems of the current system
by attaching some weight to factors that traditionally haven’t been rewarded.
None of this requires buying into the efficiency norm.362 Maybe the weights
will be wrong, but “[t]he basic question . . . is whether the dangers of providing
improper incentives through imperfect models outweigh the benefits of
providing program direction and accountability.”363 Is adding this element of
imperfect, numbers-based accountability better than not? The remaining
sections in this Part address this question.
B. Effects on Market Structure
This section discusses how performance-based compensation can change
the composition of providers. First, it will attract providers who respond better
to market incentives, which might affect the overall public-interestedness of
the industry. Second, because performance-based compensation is riskier than
flat-rate compensation, it will discourage the more risk-averse providers.
1. Public-Interestedness
Todd Henderson and Fred Tung address this concern in the context of
performance-based compensation for regulators. If regulators are currently
public-interested, introducing market incentives might change the culture
within the agency. “Once diligence has been priced, perhaps some regulators
will slack.”364
This form of compensation will also affect the mix of people who choose to
be regulators. “Public service motives might be displaced by financial
motivations among new hires . . . . Eventually, the composition of the
regulatory agency could change for the worse.”365

engineering. . . . Our view of cost-benefit analysis is much more modest. . . . [W]e think that many important
political questions . . . cannot be effectively decided by cost-benefit analysis.”).
361 See DiIulio, supra note 286, at 146.
362 See Barnow, supra note 230, at 279.
363 Id. at 307; see also M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Paying Bank Examiners for Performance,
REGULATION, Spring 2012, at 32, 36 (“We . . . make no attempt to offer firm prescriptions for the optimal ratio
[between debt and equity]. The mix should induce regulators to care about bank profits but not at the expense
of risk shifting to creditors.”).
364 M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003,
1056–57 (2012).
365 Id. at 1057.
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Henderson and Tung conclude, citing the crowding out literature,366 that
this is possible, though not necessary: “public spiritedness and financial reward
[might not be] mutually exclusive, at least up to a point.”367 Moreover,
changing the mix of individuals “could be a good,” given the failures of the
current crop of people.368
The same arguments can be applied to performance-based compensation
for prison providers. I would add that, to the extent we’re considering
performance-based compensation for private firms rather than public
servants,369 we don’t need to worry about making providers any more
mercenary than they already are: if there’s one thing advocates and opponents
of private prisons agree on, it’s that private prison providers are a profitoriented bunch. Not that the profit motive is inconsistent with publicinterestedness: public servants “profit” from their employment too without
being accused of thereby necessarily becoming mercenaries;370 moreover,
corrections professionals move between the public and private sectors and
presumably take their professionalism with them. Finally, as I discuss further
below,371 performance-based compensation, combined with social impact
bonds, allows nonprofits to raise money from private investors, so to this
extent, introducing the profit motive may turn out to be a great boon for
charitable and public-interested providers.
2. Risk and Capital Requirements
a. The Risk Is in the Slope
We’ve seen, in the discussion of Charles Logan’s approach above,372 the
concern that performance measures be based on factors that the relevant actor
can actually control. Such concerns crop up frequently;373 James Q. Wilson
even says, in the context of police departments, that public order and safety
aren’t “‘real’ measures of overall success” because whatever about them is
366 Id. at 1057 n.182 (citing Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR.
ECON. REV. 687, 688 (2002); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14
(2000)).
367 Id. at 1057.
368 Id.
369 But see supra Part II.C.3 (discussing possibilities for merit pay for public prison wardens).
370 See Volokh, supra note 6, at 178–85.
371 See infra Part III.B.2.
372 See supra text accompanying notes 316–28
373 See, e.g., DICKER, supra note 123, at 17; GRIZZLE ET AL., supra note 241, at 48–49; Petersilia, supra
note 316, at 66.
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measurable “can only partially, if at all, be affected by police behavior.”374
When he does favor a “micro-level measure of success” of whether the
neighborhood is becoming safer and more orderly,375 he still limits it to cases
where the level of danger and disorder is “amenable . . . to improvement by a
given, feasible level of police and public action.”376 The concern in the
literature over controlling for baselines is similarly motivated.377
This seems mistaken: overall public order and safety are measures of the
success of police departments, and (given that prison programs and conditions
affect recidivism to some extent378) lower recidivism is a measure of the
success of prisons.379 It’s true that these measures come with a lot of noise
attached—that is, with a lot of omitted variables reflecting the contribution of
other people’s efforts, as well as environmental variables.380 But that doesn’t
mean it’s wrong to use them for purposes of accountability, or even to tie
compensation to them.
There are two concerns about using these noisy measures: first, that the
level of the unobserved variables at the beginning of the contract might
establish a high-recidivism baseline, for which the contractor will have to be
374 James Q. Wilson, The Problem of Defining Agency Success, in PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 286, at 156, 159; see also DiIulio, supra note 333, at 1–2, 13.
375 Wilson, supra note 374, at 160–62.
376 Id. at 161.
377 See supra text accompanying notes 240–50.
378 See Camp et al., supra note 99; M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions
Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 17–21 (2007); DiIulio, supra
note 333, at 2; Francesco Drago et al., Prison Conditions and Recidivism, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 103, 120–
25 (2011); Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 115, 115 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009); Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Criminal Recidivism
After Prison and Electronic Monitoring 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15602,
2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15602.pdf; see also GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 124 (citing
ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH
LIFE (1993); Shawn D. Bushway et al., An Empirical Framework for Studying Desistance as a Process, 39
CRIMINOLOGY 491 (2001); Jeffrey Grogger, The Effect of Arrest on the Employment and Earnings of Young
Men, 110 Q.J. ECON. 51 (1995); Jeffrey R. Kling, The Effect of Prison Sentence Length on the Subsequent
Employment and Earnings of Criminal Defendants (Woodrow Wilson Sch., Discussion Paper No. 208, 1999));
id. at 129 (citing Alex R. Piquero et al., Assessing the Impact of Exposure Time and Incapacitation on
Longitudinal Trajectories of Criminal Offending, 16 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 54 (2001)); id. at 136 (citing Gerald
G. Gaes & Newton Kendig, The Skill Sets and Health Care Needs of Released Offenders, in PAPERS PREPARED
FOR THE “FROM PRISON TO HOME” CONFERENCE 93 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
410629_ReleasedOffenders.pdf).
379 DiIulio, supra note 333, at 5 (“[C]rime rates and recidivism rates are indeed important[, though not the
only,] measures of the system’s performance, which ought to be continually used and refined.”).
380 See Barnow, supra note 230, at 281 (explaining that these are “gross outcome measures . . . in the
sense that they do not necessarily reflect gains from the program”).
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compensated very highly, or a low-recidivism baseline, for which the
contractor will collect more than it deserves; and second, that variation in the
unobserved variables might create a lot of risk for the contractor.381
As to the first concern, recall the earlier discussion about whether to control
for baselines.382 Whether or not we adjust the contract price to take into
account the baseline expected level of performance should have little effect on
government expenditures: a high baseline translates into less quality being
attributed to the contractor and thus to lower payments, and so the contractor
will demand more money at the bidding stage, and vice versa.
The same reasoning addresses the second concern: because controlling for
baselines doesn’t affect the contractor’s payout—it basically amounts to
adding or subtracting a constant, which is subtracted or added right back at the
bidding stage—it also doesn’t necessarily affect risk.383
What definitely affects risk is not the level of compensation, but its slope.
A contract that compensates the contractor based on the portion of
performance he was able to control isn’t necessarily less risky than one that
doesn’t, but a contract where the per-quality-unit price is lower is less risky.
Thus, in the numerical example discussed earlier,384 a contract with a $1
reward per quality unit (regardless of the fixed component of the contract) is
riskier than a contract with a $0.50 reward per quality unit; an even less risky
contract is one with a $0 reward per quality unit, that is, a fixed-price contract,
which is close to the norm; and the least risky possible contract is the cost-plus
contract typical of rate-of-return regulation.385 Compensation based on a
continuous quality measure is less risky than compensation based on a discrete
quality measure (as long as the provider has some chance of being on either
side of the cutoff);386 thus, “$1 for each quality unit” is less risky than “$5 but
only if you get five quality units.”

381 See HARDING, supra note 72, at 68 (“[T]he human variables are too volatile for any contractor to be
expected to stand or fall by outputs alone . . . .”); Lynn, supra note 165, at 12; Kyle, supra note 162, at 2112.
382 See supra Part II.C.2.c.
383 See supra text accompanying note 255.
384 See supra text accompanying notes 234–38, 251.
385 See supra text accompanying note 340.
386 See supra text accompanying notes 258–70.
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Do we care? Perhaps large corporations like CCA or The GEO Group,
which are publicly traded387 and diversified across many contracts,388 can
handle the risk; and they cover three-quarters of the industry.389 Smaller,
privately held companies like MTC390 may be more sensitive to risk. Various
potential entrants, especially nonprofits,391 must be even more sensitive.
Adopting high-powered (i.e., high-slope) contracts may scare away the most
risk-sensitive potential bidders, leaving the field to a few large corporations.
(And it isn’t just a matter of risk: if the fixed part of the contract is paid up
front while the reward is paid later, possibly a few years later once recidivism
statistics come in, this might disadvantage small companies or nonprofits with
limited access to capital markets.)392 This has potential implications for the
competitiveness of the industry,393 possibilities for innovation,394 and the
political influence that drives changes in criminal law.395

387

See Who We Are, CCA, http://www.cca.com/who-we-are (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) (noting that CCA
joined the NYSE in 1994); Historic Milestones, GEO GROUP, http://www.geogroup.com/history (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013) (noting that GEO joined the NYSE in 1996).
388 See Who We Are, supra note 387 (“CCA houses nearly 80,000 inmates in more than 60
facilities . . . . CCA currently partners with all three federal corrections agencies . . . , many states[,] and local
municipalities.”); Who We Are, GEO GROUP, http://www.geogroup.com/about_us (last visited Dec. 12, 2013)
(“GEO’s operations include the management and/or ownership of 96 correctional, detention and residential
treatment facilities encompassing approximately 73,000 beds.”).
389 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 1237 & n.182 (relying on data from 1999).
390 See id. (noting a 5%–8% share for MTC in 1999); Overview, MGMT. & TRAINING CORP., http://www.
mtctrains.com/about-mtc/overview (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) (“Management & Training Corporation (MTC)
is a privately- held company . . . .”).
391 For discussions of the possibility of nonprofit prisons, see Low, supra note 222, at 4, and Richard
Moran, Op-Ed., A Third Option: Nonprofit Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1997, § 1, at 23. Compare with
discussions of the advantages of nonprofit schools. See Byron W. Brown, Why Governments Run Schools, 11
ECON. EDUC. REV. 287, 293–96 (1992); John Morley, Note, For-Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An
Agency Costs Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782, 1795–1810 (2006); cf. also Education: Raising the Bar,
ECONOMIST, June 15–21, 2013, at 30 (discussing risk issues for schools and teachers resulting from
educational accountability schemes).
392 NICHOLSON, supra note 216, at 6 (“The working capital requirements of a [payment-by-results] system
will cause problems for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and the third sector [i.e., nonprofits] in bidding
for contracts.”).
393 DICKER, supra note 123, at 24 (explaining that high incentives, through high risk, will “reduce the
diversity of the market” by making it less attractive for nonprofits or small companies).
394 Id. at 23. On the relationship between market concentration and innovation, see Richard Gilbert,
Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition–Innovation Debate, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 159 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2006), for an argument that the relationship is inconclusive.
395 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 1213–14 (arguing that the degree of concentration of the industry can
affect the political influence the industry exerts); see also Volokh, Privatization, Free Riding, supra note 142,
at 64; Volokh, The Effect of Privatization, supra note 142, at 10–11.
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But the contract doesn’t have to be especially high-stakes.396 The optimal
level of risk transfer is probably less than 100%. Rewarding the contractor for
increases in quality with a price equal to the social value of quality gives the
contractor great incentives but also (since the per-unit reward will be high)
subjects him to high risk.397 Flat-fee contracts are relatively low risk398 but also
low incentive. Some moderate level of risk transfer will optimally balance
incentives with risk.399 Thus, the incentive-based portion of the contract is only
10% of the contract price in U.K.’s Doncaster prison,400 and was only 5% in
the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Taft demonstration project.401 Recall that in
Britain’s Job Deal program, 30% of the payment is conditional, and only a
third of that is related to “hard outcomes,” and even some of those outcomes
are slightly “soft.”402
For the cash-flow issue noted above,403 one can also “change the timing of
payments to providers,” for instance by making “a payment every six months
for each offender who has not been reconvicted.”404
b. Financing Nonprofits: Social Impact Bonds
The need to encourage the nonprofit sector calls for innovative funding
mechanisms. Nonprofit prisons have been suggested405 though never
implemented.406 But in light of the widespread concern that private prison
firms will cut quality to save money,407 the nonprofit form seems like an
obvious alternative.
Ed Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer discuss the value of nonprofit status: by
weakening the provider’s incentives to maximize profits, nonprofit status can

396

DICKER, supra note 123, at 6.
See supra note 357.
398 Though not zero-risk: recall that the least risky contracts are cost-plus. See supra text accompanying
note 385.
399 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 23–24; NICHOLSON, supra note 216, at 6–7; see also BOLTON &
DEWATRIPONT, supra note 256, at 13 (“[W]hen both employer and employee are risk averse, they will
optimally share business risk.”).
400 See Johnson, supra note 209.
401 See supra text accompanying note 172.
402 See supra text accompanying note 218.
403 See supra text accompanying note 392.
404 DICKER, supra note 123, at 24.
405 See sources cited supra note 391.
406 See Low, supra note 222, at 4–5 (suggesting creation of nonprofit prisons on “an experimental basis”).
407 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 5, at 474–80.
397
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be a valuable signal of quality when quality itself is nonverifiable.408 (Even
using performance measures, it’s reasonable to suppose that some aspects of
quality will remain nonverifiable; the value of nonprofit status depends on how
important these remaining nonverifiable components are.)409 Moreover,
altruistic entrepreneurs will tend to be attracted to the nonprofit form.410
And Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak show that, when both a
provider and the government can make productive investments in a project,
and when the provider is altruistic, then the provider should own the project if
it values it more than the government does.411 Privatization can thus be more
beneficial in the presence of altruistic providers.
But banks or private equity houses are unlikely to finance such nonprofits,
especially when the nonprofits don’t have much of a track record.412
Social impact bonds have been proposed as a funding mechanism for
nonprofits.413 Rather than contracting directly with a provider, the government
contracts with a middleman. This middleman, a “social impact bond-issuing
organization,”414 has two functions. First, it hires the staff to provide the
service. Second, it sells bonds to investors, particularly philanthropic ones;415
these bonds are essentially claims to a portion of the performance-based
compensation. If the service provider fulfills the performance-based goals and
receives its reward from the government, the investors make money; otherwise
they don’t.416 At the Peterborough prison in the U.K., the government doesn’t
pay anything unless recidivism is 7.5% less than in a comparison group,417 and
payments are capped when the difference reaches 13%.418 The provider’s
408

Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-for-Profit Entrepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 99, 102 (2001).
See infra Part III.C.2.
410 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 408, at 102.
411 See Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods,
116 Q.J. ECON. 1343, 1347 (2001).
412 NICHOLSON, supra note 216, at 6–7.
413 JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A PROMISING NEW FINANCING MODEL TO ACCELERATE
SOCIAL INNOVATION AND IMPROVE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 2 (2011); see also Cullen et al., supra note
13, at 88–89; Michaels, supra note 276, at 1052–58; Shifali Baliga, Note, Shaping the Success of Social
Impact Bonds in the United States: Lessons Learned from the Privatization of U.S. Prisons, 63 DUKE L.J. 437
(2013).
414 LIEBMAN, supra note 413, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
415 Though social impact bonds in the United States have been funded by non-philanthropic types such as
Goldman Sachs. See Social Impact Bonds: Being Good Pays, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18–24, 2012, at 28.
416 LIEBMAN, supra note 413, at 2.
417 Id.
418 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
409
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employees may well be paid something like a flat wage, so their monetary
incentives aren’t great; but the bond-issuing organization and the philanthropic
investors (whose money is on the line) are probably better at monitoring the
staff than the government would be.419 It remains to be seen, though, whether
the philanthropic sector will provide enough funds for nonprofit prison
providers to be a viable alternative to for-profit corporations.420
C. Undesirable Strategic Behavior
Perhaps the biggest disadvantage of using performance-based
compensation is the strategic behavior it may spawn. This strategic behavior
may come in several flavors. First, there is the possibility of manipulating the
performance goals themselves. Second, effort may be distorted away from
some dimensions and toward others. Third, effort may be distorted away from
some groups of inmates and toward others. And fourth, performance measures
may simply be falsified.
1. Manipulating the Goals
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993421 is one example
of a recent effort to inject performance measures into government agencies that
hasn’t lived up to the hopes of its supporters.
One of the problems was that setting the performance goals was left to the
agencies that were to be evaluated. Agencies “tr[ied] to protect themselves by
devising euphemistic performance goals in order to ensure that they [could]
‘pass’ their own grading criteria.”422 The Patent and Trademark Office, faced
with rising backlogs, set itself progressively longer targets of “average total
pendency” from year to year, rising from 27.7 months in fiscal year 2003 to

419

See infra text accompanying note 459.
See NICHOLSON, supra note 216, at 16, 18; Big Hurdles to Be Overcome if Social Impact Bonds to
Move from Margins of Public Services, Says Think Tank, SOC. MARKET FOUND. (July 31, 2013), http://www.
smf.co.uk/media/news/big-hurdles-be-overcome-if-social-impact-bonds-move-margins-public-services-saysthink-tank/; Tom Clougherty, Pioneering Social Impact Bonds in the United Kingdom, REASON FOUND. (Aug.
13, 2013), http://reason.org/news/show/pioneering-social-impact-bonds.
421 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 31 U.S.C.); see
supra note 165.
422 Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 223, at 1744; see also id. at 1760 (“[A]gencies compelled to function
in an antiregulatory, even hostile, political atmosphere are predictably reluctant to tell the truth to power.
Instead, their goal has become convincing congressional and White House overseers that they are performing
well despite budgets that are inadequate for effective implementation of their missions.”).
420
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29.8 months in 2004, 31.0 months in 2005, and 31.3 months in 2006.423 John
DiIulio had warned of a similar danger: “that measurement-driven government
workers will, so to speak, ‘set up the target in order to facilitate shooting.’”424
The similar problem was observed in the U.K., where “Next Steps agencies,” a
type of performance-based organization, set their own targets, which often
reflected merely an incremental improvement rather than an assessment of
what was possible.425
Why would agencies set goals in such unambitious ways? Perhaps because
agencies feared being punished for bad performance with budget cuts.426
Various politicians have indeed suggested that agencies’ funding be tied to
their performance results,427 and agencies’ performance results have indeed
been relevant to the administration’s budget proposals,428 so this fear may have
been reasonable—though it’s also possible that performance scores have
merely given political cover for cuts to programs that the administration
wanted to defund for other reasons.429 On the other hand, the link between
funding and performance results isn’t that tight,430 so agencies’ concern to look
good may also have been a matter of good public relations.

423

Schoen, supra note 165, at 480.
DiIulio, supra note 286, at 154.
425 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 223, at 7.
426 Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 223, at 1744.
427 See Schoen, supra note 165, at 464 (citing The Results Act: Are We Getting Results?: Hearings Before
the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform & Oversight, 105th Cong. 20 (1997) (statement of Rep. Richard K. Armey, H.
Majority Leader)); id. at 465 (citing Seven Years of GPRA: Has the Results Act Provided Results?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info., & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 20
(2000) (statement of Rep. Pete Sessions, Chairman, H. Results Caucus)); id. at 466–67 (citing OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA (2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf).
428 See Eileen Norcross & Joseph Adamson, An Analysis of the Office of Management and Budget’s
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) for Fiscal Year 2008, at 25 (unpublished working paper),
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/20070725_Analysis_of_PART_for_FY_2008.pdf;
Eileen
Norcross & Kyle McKenzie, An Analysis of the Office of Management and Budget’s Program Assessment
Rating Tool (PART) for Fiscal Year 2007, at 22 (May 2006) (unpublished working paper), http://mercatus.
org/sites/default/files/publication/PDF__An_Analysis_of_the_Office_of_Management_of_Budgets_Program_
Assessment_Rating_Tool_for_FY_2007.pdf.
429 See John B. Gilmour & David E. Lewis, Does Performance Budgeting Work? An Examination of the
Office of Management & Budget’s PART Scores, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 742, 751 (2006); Norcross &
Adamson, supra note 428, at 29–30.
430 See, e.g., Teresa Curristine, Reforming the U.S. Department of Transportation: Challenges and
Opportunities of the Government Performance and Results Act for Federal-State Relations, PUBLIUS, Winter
2002, at 25, 42; Jerry Ellig, Has GPRA Increased the Availability and Use of Performance Information? 5
(George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 09-03, 2009).
424
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The problem here is that agencies were allowed to think up their own
performance goals; that they weren’t required to meet those goals (and indeed,
that often the performance information simply wasn’t used in
decisionmaking431); and that the goals were binary rather than continuous
outcome measures,432 for example, that the EPA “will ‘achieve and maintain at
least 95 percent of the maximum score on readiness evaluation criteria in each
region’”433 or “‘complete an additional 975 Superfund-lead hazardous
substance removal actions.’”434
These problems have easy fixes, though perhaps they weren’t so easy in the
context of the GPRA, where the problem was primarily giving performance
incentives to public agencies. Prison contracts—or merit pay systems for
public prison wardens435—should be set by the Department of Corrections or
the relevant contracting authority; goals shouldn’t be set by those who we want
to comply with them. No one should be “required” to meet any performance
standard, but compensation should be tied to these measures; providers’ selfinterest should take care of the rest. And adopting continuous outcome
measures, rather than binary goals, reduces the ability to choose easy goals:
one can game “achieve x% recidivism” by setting an appropriately high level
of x, but it’s harder to game the general effort of reducing recidivism where
additional reductions are met with additional rewards.436

431 See Schoen, supra note 165, at 466 (citing 10 Years of GPRA—Results, Demonstrated: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Efficiency & Fin. Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 4
(2004) (statement of Rep. Edolphus Towns, Member, Subcomm. on Gov’t Efficiency & Fin. Mgmt. of the H.
Comm. on Gov’t Reform)); Ellig, supra note 430, at 1 (citing Jerry Ellig & Jerry Brito, Toward a More Perfect
Union: Regulatory Analysis and Performance Management, 8 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 1 (2009)); id. at 2 (citing
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1026T, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: LESSONS LEARNED FOR
THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION ON USING PERFORMANCE INFORMATION TO IMPROVE RESULTS (2008)).
432 See supra Part II.C.2.d.
433 Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 223, at 1764 (quoting EPA, 2006–2011 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN:
CHARTING OUR COURSE 67 (2006), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P1001IPK.PDF).
434 Id. at 1765 (quoting EPA, supra note 433, at 67); see also id. at 1773 (“[A]ttain water quality standards
for all pollutants and impairments in more than 2,250 water bodies . . . . [R]emove at least 5,600 . . . specific
causes of water body impairment . . . . [I]mprove water quality conditions in 250 . . . impaired watersheds
nationwide . . . .” (altered capitalization and third and fifth omissions in original) (quoting EPA, supra note
433, at 43)).
435 See supra Part II.C.3.
436 See also Barnow, supra note 230, at 287 (discussing “whether the size of the award should vary with
the extent to which standards are exceeded”); id. at 291–92 (“The national standards are set, based on
experience in prior years, so that approximately 75 percent of the nation’s [providers] will exceed the
standards . . . .”).
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2. Distortion Across Dimensions of Performance
Everyone agrees that, in most areas, performance has multiple
dimensions.437 Each dimension, in a performance-based contract, will have its
price,438 and the relative prices of different dimensions will determine how the
contractor will allocate his effort among them.439
So far, so good, as long as the set of performance measures is complete.
But what if some dimensions of performance are unmeasurable?440 Just as
cost–benefit analysis is accused of slighting the soft factors,441 so might
performance measures be biased in favor of the measurable. The result is that
the contractor’s work effort will be biased in the direction of increasing the
measurable dimensions of performance.442
Consider a hypothetical example involving education. Suppose there are
two measures of educational quality: “hard” (e.g., knowledge of facts) and
“soft” (e.g., citizenship, critical thinking, socialization). Without hard
accountability, it might be hard to give teachers serious incentives, so they will
slack in their overall work effort, but divide their time between hard and soft
education in a balanced way. With hard accountability, teachers can get much
higher-powered incentives, but these incentives will tend to be skewed toward
the hard measures of education. Thus, the teachers will provide more overall
work effort, but their time will be skewed toward hard education.443
How serious is this problem? It depends how important it is to have a
balance between hard and soft factors, how hard the soft factors really are to
measure, and how harmful the status quo of low work effort is.444 It also
437

See supra text accompanying notes 291, 332–33.
See supra text accompanying note 356.
439 See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts,
Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 24, 25 (1991) (“In general, when
there are multiple tasks, incentive pay serves not only to allocate risks and to motivate hard work, it also serves
to direct the allocation of the agents’ attention among their various duties.”).
440 See supra text accompanying note 352 (noting retributivism as a possible unmeasurable dimension).
441 See supra text accompanying note 352.
442 See GRIZZLE ET AL., supra note 241, at 50–51.
443 See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 439, at 25 (“It would be better, . . . critics argue, to pay a fixed
wage without any incentive scheme than to base teachers’ compensation only on the limited dimensions of
student achievement that can be effectively measured.” (italics omitted)); see also Peter Smith, On the
Unintended Consequences of Publishing Performance Data in the Public Sector, 18 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 277,
284 (1995) (discussing “tunnel vision”); Education: Raising the Bar, supra note 391.
444 See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 439, at 26 (“[T]he desirability of providing incentives for any
one activity decreases with the difficulty of measuring performance in any other activities that make
competing demands on the agent’s time and attention.”).
438
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depends on whether the one type of education makes the other type easier or
harder for the teacher; an excessively high-powered accountability system
focusing, say, on standardized test scores could easily promote a “teaching to
the test” strategy that can be antithetical to critical thinking (at the very least by
taking up class time that could be otherwise used);445 this isn’t necessarily so,
but it may be likely.446 Providing high-powered but skewed accountability may
be beneficial in severely dysfunctional school systems where neither hard nor
soft factors are taught well, but it may be harmful in better school systems.
Analogously, in the prison context, one can imagine two dimensions of
quality: humane in-prison conditions and low recidivism after prison. Suppose
one of these is harder to measure than the other. In-prison conditions could be
harder to measure if effective monitoring is difficult;447 or perhaps recidivism
is harder to measure if there aren’t good databases of offenders, especially if
released inmates often commit their crimes in other states. Whichever one
turns out to be less measurable, we can expect effort to be skewed toward the
more measurable one.
Would it make a difference if prison policies were skewed toward humane
conditions or toward reducing recidivism? If the two go together—if humane
conditions are, on balance, effective at reducing recidivism448—then the
inability to monitor both dimensions can be harmless. On the other hand, if bad
prison conditions, on balance, reduce recidivism through a general deterrent
effect,449 a focus on recidivism could lead to bad prison conditions—in which
case there’s no guarantee that high-powered accountability would improve
overall quality in the absence of effective in-prison monitoring. Since the
445 This assumes that test scores really are a true outcome measure, even if a partial one. Perhaps this is
too charitable, though: it may be better to characterize test scores as proxy measures for a type of intelligence,
and “teaching to the test” as a form of manipulation, as described below. See infra text accompanying note
457.
446 See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 439, at 25; id. at 32–33 (explaining that the desirability of
incentives for measurable tasks depends on whether measurable and unmeasurable tasks are complements or
substitutes in an agent’s cost function).
447 See infra Part III.C.4.
448 See sources cited supra note 378.
449 See, e.g., Kelly Bedard & Eric Helland, The Location of Women’s Prisons and the Deterrence Effect of
“Harder” Time, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 147, 159–61 (2004); Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions,
Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318, 331 (2003); Volokh, supra note 344, at
843–45. But see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64 (1990) (“The most important normative
influence on compliance with the law is the person’s assessment that following the law accords with his or her
sense of right and wrong; a second factor is the person’s feeling of obligation to obey the law and allegiance to
legal authorities.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953–56 (2003).
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precise determinants of recidivism aren’t well understood, this shows the
importance of properly monitoring whatever is considered desirable in the
prison.450
In the extreme case, where some tasks remain completely unmeasurable
and shirking on that task is highly detrimental to overall quality, we should
junk the idea of high-powered incentives: the traditional input-and-output
approach may then be optimal.451
If an unmeasurable outcome is represented in the accountability scheme by
some inputs or outputs as proxies, the possibilities for undesirable strategic
behavior multiply. The previous examples involved ignoring the unmeasurable
elements and maximizing the measurable component of performance, rather
than maximizing overall performance. Replacing unmeasurable elements with
proxies within the provider’s direct control leads to pursuing the proxies for
their own sake—which one can uncharitably call “manipulating” the proxy
measures.
For example, consider recidivism rates, which I’ve been treating
throughout as a true outcome measure. In reality, no one knows true recidivism
rates; we don’t know that a released inmate has committed a crime unless we
catch him (and, depending on the recidivism measure we’re using, unless we
convict him or reincarcerate him).452 So in reality, rather than using the
unmeasurable dimension of recidivism, we’re using the measurable proxy of,
say, rearrest rates. If the relationship between rearrest rates and true recidivism
is stable, using this proxy can be harmless;453 but more important still is that
the contractor not be able to manipulate the rates in ways that don’t correspond
to true social improvements.
Thus, if in-prison misconduct is penalized, corrections officers will use
their discretion very differently when deciding whether to write up an
450 See infra Part III.C.4; see also Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 84 (“Of course, some correctional
managers might attempt to develop a painful prison in hopes of scaring offenders straight. We are confident
that these efforts will fail and place managers at a disadvantage.” (citation omitted)).
451 See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 439, at 27 (“[I]ncentives for a task can be provided in two
ways: either the task itself can be rewarded or the marginal opportunity cost for the task can be lowered by
removing or reducing the incentives on competing tasks. Constraints are substitutes for performance incentives
and are extensively used when it is hard to assess the performance of the agent.”).
452 See supra text accompanying note 120.
453 Of course, the relationship between rearrest rates and true recidivism can change—for instance,
enforcement agencies might, over time, reallocate resources from one type of crime to another. This raises the
question of whether to control for baseline rates. See supra Part II.C.2.c.
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offense.454 If urinalysis tests based on suspicion are rewarded, we can
magically expect more inmates to seem suspicious. Perhaps the output (drug
tests based on suspicion) seems to have a straightforward correlation with the
outcome (inmate drug use, if one chooses to consider that an outcome455); but
make it a subject of compensation, and you can’t rely on that correlation
anymore. Administrators will start pursuing the output for its own sake.
(Random drug tests unrelated to suspicion remove that gaming problem, even
if they are more expensive for the same level of deterrence.)
Similarly, in the context of community corrections, Joan Petersilia
criticizes the use of recidivism rates as an outcome measure: if the number of
arrests increases, is that bad because more people are committing offenses? Or
is it good because probation officers are better at detecting technical violations
and sending released offenders back to prison?456 If we decided that increased
arrest rates were bad and attached penalties to that variable, we might find
arrest rates plummeting, but merely because probation officers stopped
supervising their charges very closely.
Recidivism may thus be a bad measure for the accountability of probation
officers. But it can be a good measure for the accountability of prisons,
provided that prisons leave supervision and rearrest to entirely separate actors.
This is a reason to insist on the separation of prisons and probation officers, not
granting contracts to criminal justice providers that are too integrated, and
more generally preventing prisons from giving any incentives at all, even
subtle ones, to probation officers.457 Similarly, the results of drug testing can
be an acceptable measure, but random testing is better than testing based on
suspicion. In-prison misconduct can be an acceptable measure, but it should be
the type of serious misconduct that’s least likely to be overlooked or
characterized as something else.
We might even have to guard against other kinds of gaming: if prisons can
affect where prisoners are released, for instance by partnering with post-release
job placement programs that have good contacts in particular areas, they can
try to have prisoners released in areas where policing is weaker. For
understandable political economy reasons, a state Department of Corrections
454

See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 51. Currently, there is, to the contrary, some incentive for private
firms to exaggerate infractions so as to prevent early releases. See Dolovich, supra note 5, at 518–23.
455 I prefer to think of drug use as neutral in itself, though one can want to control inmate drug use
instrumentally for the sake of outcomes like violence or rehabilitation.
456 See Petersilia, supra note 316, at 66–67; see also GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 23–24; supra note 76.
457 See Smith, supra note 443, at 286, 290–92 (discussing “suboptimization” and “measure fixation”).
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might choose to ignore the welfare of people in other states and tie
compensation only to an in-state measure of recidivism; then, the prison does
better by finding out-of-state jobs for its inmates. A prison might also try to
prevent recidivism by “paying offenders to desist,” but this might be
controversial.458
Of course, even if we only use performance measures to reward providers,
providers will inevitably have to translate these incentives into specific inputor output-based incentives to reward their own staff, at least in part—there are
limits to the possibilities of stock options.459 And such incentives can
sometimes backfire for the same reasons that input-based incentives can
backfire at the prison level. At one CCA prison in Tennessee, the employee
compensation policy discouraged “use-of-force incidents.”460 In general, this
can be positive, but sometimes not: for nine straight months, CCA personnel
stopped removing mentally ill inmate Frank Horton from his cell for showers,
exercise, and mental health evaluations, because any attempt to do so would
have been considered a “use of force” and could have affected their bonuses or
pay raises.461 Presumably, though, a provider motivated by good performance
measures will have better incentives and better ability to monitor its own staff
than the government has to monitor the provider.
3. Distortion Across Types of Inmates
One common complaint about high-powered outcome-based incentives is
that they’ll lead to two related phenomena: “creaming”—only taking the
easiest inmates—and “parking”—not providing services to the most difficult
inmates.462 There’s an easy way to prevent providers from taking the easiest
inmates: insist that providers take all comers,463 limit opportunities for
458

DICKER, supra note 123, at 19.
On the use of stock options in private prisons, see Volokh, supra note 6, at 174.
460 Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 662, 628 (6th Cir. 2011).
461 Id. at 623–24.
462 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 23; see also RICHARD A. MCGOWAN, PRIVATIZE THIS?: ASSESSING THE
OPPORTUNITIES AND COSTS OF PRIVATIZATION 166 (2011); Barnow, supra note 230, at 287, 297–98, 305–06;
Pozen, supra note 79, at 283; Kyle, supra note 162, at 2112; Inwood, supra note 210. For a recent example of
parking in a non-prison context, see Mary Shinn et al., Despite Backlogs, VA Disability Claims Processors Get
Bonuses, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-25/world/41446536_1_
claims-processors-new-claims-backlog.
463 See Gilroy, supra note 163 (“So literally, you have the private vendor take over the exact same
population, and then use the same metrics you use to assess the public facilities.”); cf. Volokh, supra note 449,
at 806–07 (arguing that requiring prisoners to take all comers makes sense to prevent prisons from
systematically rejecting certain inmates).
459
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providers to transfer inmates they don’t like out of the prison, and have
assigning agencies not discriminate either in favor of or against particular
providers in assignment.464 And the bias toward treating easier inmates can be
alleviated by mandating particular services for everyone. There remains,
though, the concern that providers will be, for instance, more enthusiastic
about providing rehabilitative services to those that can more likely benefit
from them.
There are two lines of response to this concern. Clearly, paying the same
rate, regardless of how hard the offender is to serve, will lead to parking; one
can therefore provide payments that are inmate specific, where a harder-toserve inmate’s desistance from crime is rewarded more generously than an
easier-to-serve inmate’s.465 These payments can be based on the observable
characteristics of the inmate; some characteristics might be illegal to consider
while others can be better observed by the provider than by the government, so
there will inevitably be some degree of mismatch.466 But a system of
nonuniform rewards can generally alleviate parking.
The second line of response would question whether parking is even bad.
Suppose some inmates are hard to rehabilitate, so prisons—in the presence of
uniform rewards—will tend to spend less time trying to rehabilitate them. Is
this bad? Some nonuniformity of rewards will be inevitable—presumably a
murder by a released inmate will be penalized more heavily than a minor
crime. But suppose there’s a group of inmates whose recidivism is equally
harmful. Wouldn’t it be socially beneficial for the provider to concentrate its
resources on the ones whose crimes can be prevented most cheaply, so that
more inmates can be treated at the same cost?467 At least, so an efficiency
framework might counsel. If one subscribes to a certain form of equity where
everyone should have some amount of (even ineffective) rehabilitation, one
might want to fall back on the solution I mentioned above: offering higher

464

See supra text accompanying notes 135–36.
See DICKER, supra note 123, at 24; NICHOLSON, supra note 216, at 6–7; David Boyle, The Perils of
Obsessive Measurement, RSA (Nov. 1, 2010), http://comment.rsablogs.org.uk/2010/11/01/perils-obsessivemeasurement/.
466 Cf. Volokh, supra note 344, at 806–07 (discussing inmate characteristics that institutions are able to
consider).
467 One could argue—though I’m not doing so here—that even outright creaming, where prisons only
accept the easier-to-treat inmates, might be beneficial, since it might be worthwhile to separate the “better”
criminals from the harmful influence of the “worse” ones. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 449, at 837–38.
465
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payments for the harder-to-treat inmates468 or, if that can’t be done reliably,
mandating some amount of inputs or outputs.
4. Falsifying Performance Measures
Finally, when high-stakes compensation depends on numbers, there’s an
obvious incentive to falsify the numbers themselves.469 Reports of school
cheating scandals are commonplace.470 Similarly, in the prison context, private
providers plausibly prefer to underreport incidents, at least if they wouldn’t
inevitably become known.471 Failure to report is grounds for contract
termination, which can cut in the other direction, but contract termination is a
strong remedy that’s rarely used.472 Public prisons, on the other hand, might
have an incentive to overreport to get more funds but they also might have an
incentive to underreport to make themselves look better compared to private
prisons.473 Misconduct data are thus somewhat unreliable, especially if one
wants to use them to compare different prisons.
Whichever way the incentives cut, the fact that compensation will
inevitably be to some extent based on variables reported by the provider means
that it’s important to seriously invest in monitoring. Currently, monitoring
practices vary quite a lot, “from minimal attention from a centrally located
contract administrator to a combination of a contract administrator and one or
more on-site monitors.”474 The monitors themselves may have responsibility
for more than one facility, which puts them on site at any particular prison
once a quarter, once a week, or daily.475 Instead, contracts should provide for a
full-time, on-site monitor476 with “unlimited access to the correctional facilities
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DICKER, supra note 123, at 25.
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470 See, e.g., Emily Richmond, Did High-Stakes Testing Cause the Atlanta Schools Teaching Scandal?,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/04/did-high-stakestesting-cause-the-atlanta-schools-cheating-scandal/274619/.
471 See JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL PRISONER MACHINE: HOW AMERICA PROFITS FROM CRIME 211, 221
(2000); Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 18; Low, supra note 222, at 39 (citing JOHN L. CLARK ET AL., REPORT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: INSPECTION AND REVIEW OF THE NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL CENTER ch.
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because of potential legal liability); id. chs. VIII, XI; HARDING, supra note 145, at 323–24); Developments in
the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 9, at 1884.
472 See supra text accompanying notes 267–68.
473 See Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 18.
474 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 50.
475 See id. at 50, 51 tbl.4.1.
476 See Thomas, supra note 138, at 109.
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and assigned correctional units,”477 who isn’t the provider’s employee (even if
the contract might mandate that the provider pay his salary as part of the
deal).478 When prisoners are sent out of state, monitoring is more likely to be
“on paper” rather than “in person”—which is one reason to keep one’s
prisoners in state.
Because the capture of monitors is an enduring concern,479 other forms of
monitoring are possible: a public-interest group could be given inspection
rights,480 the surrounding community might be designated as a third-party
beneficiary,481 or the constitutional tort regime for prisons could be
strengthened (rather than weakened, which is the current trend).482
A strong disclosure regime is also probably a good idea.483
One way of guaranteeing disclosure is to subject private prisons under
contract with the federal government to the Freedom of Information Act,484
perhaps along the lines of the often-proposed Private Prison Information Act.
Private prison firms themselves aren’t “agencies” for the purposes of FOIA,485
and the Bureau of Prisons isn’t covered if it hasn’t “created and retained” or
doesn’t actually possess the documents.486 Even after these hurdles, much
qualifying information, like contracts or incident reports, would be exempt
under Exemption 4, which protects “trade secrets and commercial or financial
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S.B. 2038, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess., sec. 1, § 944.7115(8)(d) (Fla. 2012).
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479 Cásarez, supra note 478, at 295; Dolovich, supra note 5, at 490, 493–95.
480 See Low, supra note 222, at 38.
481 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285,
1317 (2003).
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484 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
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note 478, at 268–79.
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note 478, at 279–84.
478

VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS

414

1/21/2014 4:05 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:339

information . . . [that is] privileged or confidential.”487 Exemption 4 could be
applied either if “disclosure could impair the reliability of data,”488 or if
“disclosure would cause substantial competitive injury to the provider.”489 The
competitive injury justification could be fairly broad—knowing the terms of a
contract, for instance, can reveal the terms of the winning proposal to the
winning firm’s competitors.490 Indeed, FOIA has been criticized as “a lawful
tool of industrial espionage.”491 On the other hand, says Cásarez, FOIA
provides for the disclosure of “reasonably segregable portion[s]” of
documents,492 which “should include monitoring and reporting
requirements.”493 Logan counsels against “saddl[ing] private prison operators
with expensive monitoring requirements ‘far beyond those that exist for
government prisons,’”494 but FOIA applicability would cut in the direction of
establishing parity.
Similar legislative fixes are possible in the states: for instance, in Florida
and Georgia, open records acts “already apply to private organizations that act
on behalf of state agencies.”495 All of this (as well as any relevant public-law
value) could also be imposed on private contractors by contract; Jody Freeman
calls this process “publicization.”496
Another possibility is to ensure access to the prison by the public and the
press.497 Bentham, who had smart things to say about the bidding process two
centuries ago,498 also argued for “essentially unrestricted public access”499 to
(private) facilities. His prison design
enables the whole establishment to be inspected almost at a view, it
would be my study to render it a spectacle, as persons of all classes
487

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4); Cásarez, supra note 478, at 284–91.
Cásarez, supra note 478, at 287 (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C.
Cir. 1992)).
489 Id.
490 See id. at 289; see also supra text accompanying note 36.
491 Cásarez, supra note 478, at 292 (quoting Stephen S. Madsen, Note, Protecting Confidential Business
Information from Federal Agency Disclosure After Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 109, 113
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would, in the way of amusement, be curious to partake of: and that
not only on Sundays at the time of Divine service, but on ordinary
days at meal times or times of work: providing therefore a system of
inspection, universal, free, and gratuitous, the most effectual and
500
permanent securities against abuse.

I don’t want to endorse watching prisoners as a source of amusement (and
public access raises serious security and access-to-contraband issues), but the
idea of at least some public access does seem to have some advantages in
terms of accountability.
CONCLUSION
The failure of the comparative effectiveness studies, therefore, is
completely understandable. Aside from the methodological problems, it’s quite
plausible that the results of prison privatization have been inconclusive
because the changes in prison management that would lead to better
performance are often neither permitted nor rewarded.
Using performance measures would change this by helping us do valid
comparative studies, enabling the fair public-private competitions that are a
hallmark of competitive neutrality, and pushing policymakers to clearly
formulate what we want out of prisons. Using performance measures directly
to drive compensation has the potential to radically alter prison outcomes by
rewarding good performance and penalizing bad performance; this definitely
has applicability for private prisons but could possibly be used for public
prison wardens as well.
The critiques are serious, but I don’t believe they undermine the experiment
too seriously.
The information necessary to calculate the True Social Values in an
efficiency framework may never be available, but we can approach the
exercise with an air of humility, seeking only to improve incentives at the
margins, not to achieve optimal social engineering.
The use of market incentives probably won’t alter the public-interestedness
of those who work at private prison firms, but it might alter the mix of people
who choose to work in the public sector; on the other hand, combined with
social impact bonds, performance-based compensation can also spur the
500
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growth of nonprofit providers. Because small firms and nonprofits are
particularly sensitive to risk, the incentives should only be moderately highpowered, to trade off incentives and risk tolerance.
Performance-based compensation will give rise to certain possibly
undesirable strategic behavior. If providers can set their own goals, they’ll be
inclined to set them in ways that are easy to meet; this is why providers
shouldn’t set the goals at all, and in any event compensation should be based
on the level of a continuous variable, not a binary goal. If some dimensions of
quality are hard to measure, performance-based compensation will bias
providers’ effort toward the more measurable aspects of performance; this
means that some reliance on inputs and outputs will still be necessary, having
due regard for the need to avoid choosing measures that can be easily and
undesirably manipulated by providers. Compensation schemes might lead
providers to concentrate on treating certain inmates and neglect others; even if
this is bad (which isn’t clear), the problem can be alleviated by inmate-specific
rewards. Finally, the levels of the measures themselves can be falsified, which
points to the need for serious investments in monitoring and robust disclosure
regimes.
These concerns are real, but the lesson to take from them is that more
experimentation is required to see how much of a real-world effect they have
and to what degree they really vitiate the promise of performance incentives.
The status quo, where the level of experimentation is close to zero, is unlikely
to be optimal.

